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COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY AND THE
DETENTION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES
Rebecca Sharpless*

July 10, 2014: [O]ur message to [people who unlawfully cross the Mexican border
with their children] is simple: We will send you back. We are building additional
space to detain [families] and hold them until their expedited removal orders are
effectuated.1
Jeh Johnson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
June 24, 2015: I have reached the conclusion that we must make substantial changes
in our detention practices with respect to families and children . . . [L]ong-term
detention is an inefficient use of our resources and should be discontinued.2
Jeh Johnson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2014, the United States heralded the opening of a 2,400-bed
immigration detention center—the nation’s largest—to incarcerate Central
American women and children who had unlawfully crossed the U.S. border with
Mexico. Immigration authorities detained approximately 5,000 children and their
mothers between the summer of 2014 to the summer of 2015 and, during that period,
most were held for at least a month and some were held over a year.3 In just one year,
the United States had increased family detention by over 3000 percent.4 Responding
to what it labeled a “surge” in unauthorized border crossings by Central American
families and unaccompanied children, the United States sought to secure the
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inspiring this project and being so generous with her feedback and support.
1. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement Before the Senate
Committee on Appropriation (July 10, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statementsecretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-senate-committee-appropriations.
2. Suzanne Gamboa, DHS Secretary: Detention of Immigrant Families, Children Should End, NBC
NEWS (June 24, 2015, 11:13 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/dhs-secretary-detentionimmigrant-families-children-should-end-n380911.
3. Family Immigration Detention: Why the Past Cannot be Prologue, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION
(Am.
Bar
Ass’n.),
Jul.
31,
2015,
at
21,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20A
BA%20Family%20Detention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf.
4. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 23, 28.
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southwest border and deter additional people from making the dangerous crossing
from Mexico.5
The vast majority of the women and children were seeking asylum, a
domestic law protection based on the international law principle of non-refoulement.
Non-refoulement forbids countries from returning people to a place where they
would likely suffer persecution.6 With numbers topping 16,000 a month, the flow of
families and unaccompanied children was dubbed the “largest refugee crisis on U.S.
soil” since the Mariel boatlift in the early 1980s.7 The media broadcast chilling

5. See Julia Preston & Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Moves to Stop Surge in Illegal Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/us-plans-to-step-up-detention-anddeportation-of-migrants.html; Southwest Border Sectors: Family Unit and Unaccompanied Alien
Children (0-17) Apprehensions FY 14 Compared to FY 13, U.S. BORDER PATROL,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Southwest%20Border%20Family%20Units%
20and%20UAC%20Apps%20FY13%20-%20FY14.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) (noting that in fiscal
year 2014, U.S. immigration authorities apprehended a total of 68,541 unaccompanied children and
68,445 families, which represented a 77% increase in the number of arrivals of unaccompanied children
and a 361% increase in families over fiscal year 2013).
6. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 10, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545
(entered into force April 22, 1954); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 24841; Protocol to Amend the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791.
7. Moni Basu, Daniel’s Journey: How Thousands of Children Are Creating a Crisis in America,
CNN (June 19, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/us/immigration-undocumentedchildren-explainer. Administration officials attributed the border crossings “primarily to economic
hardship and an increase in drug-related violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.” Josh
Gerstein, Biden to Discuss Child Migrants, POLITICO (Jun. 15, 2014, 5:47 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/joe-biden-child-migrants-latin-america-107880. Critics contend
that the great majority is seeking protection from intimate partner abuse and violence at the hands of
armed criminal groups. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Org. Am. St. [OAS], Refugees and Migrants in the
United States: Families and Unaccompanied Children, at 9, OAS/Ser.L/V/II 155 Doc. 16 (July 24, 2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees reports that 136 of the 160 women interviewed for its report “stated that they
lived in neighborhoods controlled by criminal armed groups,” which “pose[] particular dangers for
women,” who are often raped and abused by gang members. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR],
Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Mexico (October 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/womenrun.html. The report further stated that “[d]omestic violence in [El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras]
is commonplace.” Id. The American Bar Association reported that the “three major factors” driving the
flows of migrants were “(1) increased gang and other violence; (2) extreme poverty; and (3) a desire for
family reunification,” but states that “[v]iolence seemed the single most important motivation, even for
those who also cited one of the other factors.” Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 16–17 (citing ELIZABETH
KENNEDY, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NO CHILDHOOD HERE: WHY CENTRAL AMERICAN
CHILDREN
ARE
FLEEING
THEIR
HOMES
1
(July
1,
2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/no_childhood_here_why_centr
al_american_children_are_fleeing_their_homes.pdf; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, CHILDREN IN
DANGER: A GUIDE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE AT THE BORDER (Jul. 10, 2014)). Criminal armed
groups and intimate partner violence is rampant and three out of the five highest murder rates in the world
are from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Global
Study on Homicide, at 50 (2011), https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/backgroundinformation/Crime_Statistics/Global_Study_on_Homicide_2011.pdf.
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images of children being packed into crowded holding rooms.8 Over half of the
children were age six or younger.9
The response of U.S. officials to the unauthorized arrival of women
traveling with their children was swift and unequivocal. Vice President Biden told
the entrants, “[W]e’re going to send the vast majority of you back.”10 On July 10,
2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson sought emergency supplemental
funding of $3.7 billion from the Senate Committee on Appropriations in light of the
increase in border arrivals.11 He assured the Committee that the United States would
“adhere to domestic and international law, due process, and the basic principles of
charity, decency, and fairness.”12 At the same time, he echoed the Vice President’s
words: “our message to [adults who brought their children] is simple: we will send
you back. We are building additional space to detain [women and their children] and
hold them until their expedited removal orders are effectuated.” 13 The New York
Times reported that the Secretary told elected officials at a temporary detention camp
in Arizona that the Department of Homeland Security will “ship [the families] back”
just “[a]s soon as [it] get[s] them.”14
Yet six months after opening the new mammoth family detention center in
December 2014, Secretary Johnson announced that the U.S. government was making
“substantial changes to [its] detention practices when it comes to families.”15 In a
statement issued shortly after the Secretary’s announcement, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement stated that it “will generally not detain mothers with children,
absent a threat to public safety or national security, if they have received a positive
finding for credible or reasonable fear [of returning to their home country] and the
individual has provided a verifiable residential address.”16 Detention centers would

8. Brandon Darby, Leaked Images Reveal Children Warehoused in Crowded U.S. Cells, Border
Patrol Overwhelmed, BREITBART (Jun. 5, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Texas/2014/06/05/LeakedImages-Reveal-Children-Warehoused-in-Crowded-US-Cells-Border-Patrol-Overwhelmed.
9. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3.
10. Joel Gehrke, Joe Biden Discusses Immigration Reform with Central American Leaders, NAT’L
REVIEW (Jun. 21, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/380918/joe-biden-discussesimmigration-reform-central-american-leaders-joel-gehrke.
11. Johnson, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detentioncamps.html?_r=1; see also, Juan Carlos Llorca, Fed Says They Will Expedite Deportations to 10-15 Days
at N.M. Facility, SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/fed-saysthey-will-expedite-deportations-to-10-15-days-at-nm-facility/ (reporting that in June 2014, a senior
government official told reporters that “the goal is to process the immigrants and have them deported
within 10 to 15 days to send a message back to their home countries that there are consequences for illegal
immigration”).
15. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Family Residential Centers (June
24, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residentialcenters.
16. Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, ICE Announcement on Detention of Mothers
and Children (Jul. 13, 2015), http://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-detention-mothers-children. Previously, in
May 2015, the Department announced that it would review the detention status of anyone in family
detention over 90 days. Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyer’s Ass’n, ICE Announces Series of
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be used for the most part as processing centers for initial screenings for asylum and
other claims for protection. Advocates and House Democrats characterized the more
liberal release policy as a “long-overdue step.”17 According to government statistics,
at least eighty-six percent of those detained have now established a significant
possibility of winning asylum.18 As families continue to flee Central America, U.S.
officials, at least for now, are abiding by their promise to refrain from the en masse,
lengthy detention of women and their children.
Cosmopolitanism is a form of democratic political theory that resonates
with scholars and advocates who favor better treatment of immigrants both at the
border and inside the country.19 While the exact origins of cosmopolitanism are in
dispute, many point to the writings of the Cynic Greek philosopher Diogenes, who
famously proclaimed himself as a kosmopolites (“a citizen of the world”), and the
Ancient Stoics, who placed value on serving humankind rather than simply one’s
own polis.20 Immanuel Kant’s highly influential Toward a Perpetual Peace called
for a voluntary league of states and for states to respect the rights of both citizens
and foreigners as “citizens of the world.”21 In the 1990s, Martha Nussbaum
popularized a form of liberal cosmopolitan political theory with her essay Patriotism
and Cosmopolitanism, in which she argued that people have “moral obligations to
the world.”22
In general, cosmopolitans embrace the core tenets that the individual is the
fundamental unit of concern, each person is of equal worth, and people have duties
to one another as human beings and only secondarily as members of a community or
Actions Related to Family Detention Centers (May 13, 2015), http://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-actionsrelated-to-family-detention-center; see also Gamboa, supra note 2.
17. Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Release of Refugee Families is Long-Overdue
Step (July 13, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/release-of-refugee-familiespositive-overdue-step; see also Press Release, Representative Roybal-Allard, Representative Gutierrez &
Representative Lofgren, U.S. Congress, Statement on ICE Release of Some Detained Families (Jul. 14,
2015), http://roybal-allard.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397876.
18. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., FAMILY FACILITIES CREDIBLE/REASONABLE FEAR
(2014–16),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20
Engagements/PED_CF_RF_FamilyFacilitiesFY14_16Q2.pdf.
19. By cosmopolitanism, I mean “the concern for the world as if it were one’s polis.” SEYLA
BENHABIB, RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 174 (2004) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF
OTHERS]. Some prefer the distinct but related term “transnationalism.” See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Citizenship Paradox in A Transnational Age, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2008) (defining
transnationalism as “some combination of plural civic and political memberships, economic
involvements, social networks, and cultural identities that reach across and link people and institutions in
two or more nation-states in diverse, multilayered patterns” (quoting Peggy Levitt & Mary C. Waters,
Introduction to THE CHANGING FACE OF HOME: THE TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF THE SECOND
GENERATION 1, 5 (Peggy Levitt & Mary C. Waters eds., 2002) (internal quotations omitted))).
20. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY:
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 4 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1997); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, DIGNITY
IN ADVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN TROUBLED TIMES 5 (2011) [hereinafter DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY]
(citing historical sources claiming that Socrates replied that he was from “the world” rather than Athens
when asked where he was from) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
21. IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD A PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 137 (M. Campbell
Smith trans., 3rd ed.1917) (1795).
22. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 1994),
http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism.
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state.23 While cosmopolitans are pluralists and “celebrate[] the fact that there are
different local human ways of being,” they owe primary “allegiance . . . to the
worldwide community of human beings.”24 Cosmopolitans typically subscribe to the
view that a person’s life opportunities should not be dictated by where she was
born.25
This Article employs the cosmopolitan political theory of Seyla Benhabib
as a framework for understanding the U.S. government’s shifting decisions about
family detention and immigration policy more generally. Although Benhabib is a
leading political theorist, few have used her work to analyze particular immigration
policies or laws. This Article begins to fill that gap. Benhabib has much to offer
scholars and advocates who envision a world of expanded opportunities for
immigrants seeking to enter and for those already here. She calls for increasingly
porous, but not open, borders, providing a middle-ground between utopian openborder positions and the exclusionary bent of liberal communitarianism.26
Benhabib’s embrace of periodic amnesty for undocumented immigrants, her critique
of strong insider/outsider claims and her optimism that liberal democracies are
becoming more cosmopolitan supply an architecture for ambitious pro-immigrant
politics.27
As applied to the detention of Central American families, Benhabib’s theory
regards the United States’ changing detention policies as a reflection of a constitutive
tension of liberal democracies—the tension between adherence to principles of
universal application, like respect of dignity and freedom of movement, and a
concern for the particular, including self-determination and the practical necessity of
maintaining a territorial border.28 The United States’ decision to build the nation’s
largest immigration detention center to hold women and children until their legal
claims are processed, followed by the significant (but not complete) retreat from
long-term detention less than a year later, can be understood as attempts to navigate
these contradictory impulses in the context of a globalizing world order. The initial
U.S. response to the flow of families through the southeast border was an aggressive
assertion of sovereignty that communicated a racial and class message about
American identity. Ironically, the government’s exclusionary response was an
attempt, at least in part, to garner political support for granting temporary status to
undocumented immigrants already inside the United States. In contrast, the United
States’ subsequent shift away from long-term family detention represents a
withdrawal from territoriality in favor of universal human dignity—a move
consistent with a more cosmopolitan view of the world. Although the United States
has done its best to maintain the outsider status of released Central American

23. See infra text accompanying notes 32–35.
24. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING
THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 4 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1997); see also KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS
OF IDENTITY 25 (2005). In taking individuals as the fundamental unit of concern, cosmopolitans contrast
with communitarians. See, e.g., CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 16
(2001) (discussing how cosmopolitans contrast with communitarians).
25. Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 4; see also APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY, supra note 24, at 25.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 32–83.
27. Id.
28. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 2.
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families, the dialing back of long-term family detention has redrawn the
insider/outsider lines and laid the groundwork for expansion of the polity to include
the families.
A key question for cosmopolitans is how to ensure that the tension between
universality and territoriality is increasingly resolved in favor of a more open society.
Benhabib is a discourse theorist in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas. Under discourse
theory, “only those norms and normative institutional arrangements are valid which
can be agreed to by all concerned under special argumentation situations named
discourses.”29 Discourses contrast with other forms of communication where the
conditions for deliberative dialogue are not present.30 Benhabib argues that creating
the conditions under which true discourse can occur will help to ensure increasing
cosmopolitanism. However, as discussed below, nondiscursive processes, like
strategic bargaining, assertions of power, and resistance, were largely responsible for
the move toward respecting the dignity of the Central American families. The family
detention example illustrates the dynamic nature of the relationship between strategic
maneuvering and rationale dialogue during struggles that rebalance universality and
territoriality.
Cosmopolitans envision a world in which national border crossings are
decriminalized and territorial boundaries are more fluid. Although the decision to
recede from long term family detention was a victory for the immigrants and their
advocates, it is far from clear that the change is permanent or that it indicates a
general move toward a more forgiving U.S. border. Immigration enforcement at the
border is more militarized than ever, and the last two decades have seen a four-fold
increase in immigration detention. Trading on fear of immigrants and immigration,
Donald Trump has become President.31 Moreover, all gains for the detained families
were secured within the limited legal framework of refugee protection.
This Article discusses the limitations, and radical possibilities, of
immigrants and their advocates working within the rule of law—including refugee
law and human rights norms—to edge the United States toward the realization of
Benhabib’s cosmopolitan world order populated by democracies with porous
boundaries. Following this Introduction, Part II summarizes Benhabib’s political
theory and the paradox of closure at the heart of liberal democracies that is

29. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 13 (citing JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
(1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
30. Id.
31. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trumps False Comments Connecting Mexicans and Crime, WASH.
POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donaldtrumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime (statement of President Donald
Trump) (“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re
sending people that have lots of problems. They have problems, and they’re bringing those problems with
us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good
people.”). President Trump has called for the end of birth right citizenship and questioned a judge’s
objectivity because of his Mexican descent. Max Ehrenfreund, Understanding Trump’s Plan to End
Citizenship For Undocumented Immigrants’ Kids, The Washington Post (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/08/17/understanding-trumps-plan-to-endcitizenship-for-undocumented-immigrants-kids/?utm_term=.a4754531e7b6; Theodore Schleifer, Trump
Defends
Criticism
of
Judge
with
Mexican
Heritage,
CNN
(June
5,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/03/politics/donald-trump-tapper-lead/.
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
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responsible for the constitutive tension between universality and territoriality. Parts
III and IV contain a brief history of the detention of immigrant families in the United
States and an explanation of the key events during the flow of Central American
families across the U.S. border. Part V applies Benhabib’s political theory to the
phenomenon of the detention of the Central American families. Part VI considers
whether advocating within the legal system is capable of bringing about Benhabib’s
cosmopolitan world. The vision of such a world allows reimagining of the U.S.
response to the Central American families.
II.

BENHABIB’S COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY

Benhabib is a leading proponent of cosmopolitanism in the Kantian
tradition, which she describes as “the emergence of norms that ought to govern
relations among individuals in a global civil society.”32 Grounded in the equal worth
of every human being, Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism takes the central question to be
“how we can fashion political and legal institutions to govern ourselves, all together,
on this earth.”33 Like Kant, Benhabib endorses the idea of a world federation but not
a world government.34 Democratic states are valuable sites of pluralism and self-

32. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 20 (2006) [hereinafter ANOTHER
COSMOPOLITANISM].
33. Robert Post, Introduction to SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 1 (Robert Post ed.,
2006). The concern for all individuals stems from Kant’s categorical imperative; see also SIMON CANEY,
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS 158 (2005) (characterizing as a cosmopolitan norm the idea that “persons
have a democratic right to be able to affect those aspects of the social economic political system in which
they live that impact on their ability to exercise their rights” (emphasis in original)); Jeremy Waldron,
What Is Cosmopolitan?, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 227, 238 (2000) (“Cosmopolitan right was understood primarily
in terms of a set of constraints governing what a people was entitled to do . . . as they came alongside
strangers, or what they were entitled to do as strangers moved closer to them.”). See generally Nussbaum,
supra note 24, at 2; APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY, supra note 24, at 25; KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,
COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006);; ULRICH BECK, COSMOPOLITAN VISION
(2006); CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 153 (1979); MICHAEL
GREEN & IRIS MARION YOUNG, CITIZENSHIP, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (Mitja Sardoc ed., 2006);
Charles R. Beitz, Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics, 33 INT’L ORG. 405 (1979);
Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1056–71 (2007); Thomas W. Pogge,
Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 51 & n.9 (1992); Thomas Pogge, Rawls and Global
Justice, 18 CAN. J. PHIL. 227 (1988).
34. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 24 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE
155–56 (M. Campbell Smith trans., 1st. ed. 1903) (1795)) (endorsing a world federation, which values
republican self-governance, not world government, which would result in “soulless despotism”); see also
NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 139
(2009) (discussing the critique that “new global institutions lack democratic accountability and serve the
interests of the global elite.”); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8–9 (2004) (discussing
the “governance dilemma,” namely that institutions are needed but potentially oppressive); IRIS MARION
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 236 (2000) (“Many people rightly distrust projects of cosmopolitan
governance . . . on grounds of cultural homogenization or dangers of domination of some people by others.
This chapter takes such suspicions seriously.”); Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,
103 ETHICS 48, 63 (1992) (“While a world state could lead to significant progress in terms of peace and
economic justice, it also poses significant risks of oppression.”). For an argument in favor of a world
government, see LUIS CABRERA, POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR
THE WORLD STATES (1st. ed. 2004).
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governance and embody cosmopolitan norms in different ways.35 What Benhabib
calls “cosmopolitan federalism” is the idea that “between the norms of international
law and the actions of individual democratic legislatures, multiple ‘iterations’ are
possible and desirable.”36 As described more fully below, Benhabib uses the concept
of iteration to describe how universal cosmopolitan norms translate in different ways
into actual democracies.
This vision is both normative and descriptive: not only should states
incorporate universal norms, such as human dignity and freedom of movement, into
their positive law, but, over time, they increasingly do.37 Benhabib saw “in the spread
of the institutions of the European Union and the disaggregation of citizenship rights
an advance toward legal and political cosmopolitanism.”38 At the same time, she
recognizes that the path toward cosmopolitanism is not perfect: “[i]n some cases, no
normative learning may take place at all, but only a strategic bargaining among the
parties.”39 Moreover, there is always the risk that iterations will not work in the
direction of cosmopolitanism. Societies sometimes reject cosmopolitanism and
devolve into restrictionism and xenophobia, as is arguably the case in Europe and
the United States today.40
For Benhabib, democracy thrives on a polity whose membership is
constantly renegotiated and whose members have multiple and diverse democratic
attachments at the national, subnational, and transnational levels. Critical to
Benhabib’s political theory is her separation of a society’s ethnos from its demos.
The ethnos is the core community that is bound together by a shared past and culture,
whereas the demos is the broader group of society that has the right to vote and
participate in political life.41 Unlike communitarian liberals, Benhabib does not
believe that democracy depends on the ethnos and the demos being coextensive.42
Moreover, the boundaries of the ethnos and demos are fluid. The demos can be
expanded, and the ethnos can, and should, “reconstitute[] itself in more universalistic

35. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 262 (2006) (state sovereignty “express[es] . . . human choice and autonomy”); Kwame
Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 621 (1997) (cosmopolitanism
“celebrates the fact that there are different local human ways of being”).
36. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 176.
37. Id. at 177 (making the descriptive claim that “[c]osmopolitan norms today are becoming
embedded in the political and legal culture of individual polities”); see also DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra
note 20, at 22 (“Democratic iterations is a normative concept with empirical import.”); id. at 151
(“Democratic iterations provides us with an idealized account of political legitimacy” and the “concept
has both an empirical and a normative component.”).
38. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 166.
39. Id. at 50; see also DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 152 (the concept of democratic
iterations “is concerned to analyze how real processes of democratic discourse within and across state
boundaries can create or fail to create justification through legitimation” (italics removed)).
40. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 171; DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at
194 (urging us not to “forget the potential dystopias of our times”).
41. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 63 (explaining that the ethnos is “a community
bound together by the power of shared fate, memories, solidarity, and belonging”).
42. Id. at 68 (“The constitution of ‘we, the people’ is a far more fluid, contentious, contested and
dynamic process than either Rawlsian liberals or decline-of-citizenship theorists would have us believe.”).
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terms.”43 Over time, immigrants become part of the ethnos, simultaneously carrying
on and reinventing the traditions of the ethnos.
Cosmopolitans take as a central focus “the predicament of the stranger” and
the “accident of where one is born.”44 For Benhabib, Kantian hospitality forms the
basis of the duty that people have to outsiders.45 People should be “fundamental[ly]
. . . welcoming toward the other.”46 At a minimum, hospitality requires that states
give strangers temporary entry into a community if the denial of entry would cause
the death of the stranger.47 The widely accepted international law principle of
nonrefoulement—the principle that states must not return people to countries where
they would likely be persecuted—has roots in Kantian hospitality.
Benhabib theorizes not only about refugees but unauthorized entrants. As a
matter of morality, she argues that people should strive for “‘infinite receptivity’
toward and respect in the face of the other.”48 But she accepts that in the real world,
“limits are set, boundaries are established and protected with violence.”49 Although
states can regulate their borders, they must not criminalize unauthorized entry
because freedom of movement is a universal human right. Moreover, while states
may currently have no obligation to permit non-refugee migrants to enter, once they
are present, Benhabib urges that polities eventually incorporate them into the demos
through amnesty.50
A.

The Paradox of Democratic Closure

Democracies must exclude to exist, at least according to standard cannons
of liberal political theory.51 But exclusion poses a paradox for democracies.52 Two
43. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 174.
44. Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1069 (2007).
45. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 107, 111 (referring to To Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch, in IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS,
HISTORY, AND MORALS 11 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)).
46. Id. at 157.
47. Id. at 22 (citing Kant, who describes hospitality “as the right of an alien not to be treated as an
enemy upon his arrival in another’s country. If it can be done without destroying him, he can be turned
away; but as long as he behaves peaceably he cannot be treated as an enemy.” (quoting To Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 11 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983))).
48. Id. at 157.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 174 (discussing “the renegotiation of the boundaries between ethnos and demos such that
the core nation reconstitutes itself in more universalistic terms . . . [including] provid[ing] amnesty for
undocumented aliens”); DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 149 (“It is unjust to deny eventual
membership to anyone who has been absorbed into the civil society and market of a particular community
for a certain period of time.”).
51. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 396 (2007) (describing this phenomenon as “hard-on-the-outside and
soft-on-the-inside); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in A Transnational Age, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1111, 1125 (2008) (noting that “[Michael] Walzer, along with most liberal political theorists,
assumes the democratic legitimacy of border closure”).
52. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 119–31 (1989); Frederick G. Whelan,
Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in NOMOS XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 13–
47 (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983); see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE
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fundamental principles of democracy are that consenting members of the polity
fashion the rules of governance and that these rules apply universally. However,
actual democracies are born of historic contingencies, including wars, conquests, and
arbitrary line drawing. Universality runs up against territoriality because the rights
and privileges of membership exist only within a bounded community. Benhabib
points to the lack of legitimacy at the heart of democracy: “The democratic people
constitutes itself as sovereign over a territory only through such historically
contingent processes, and these attest to the violence inherent in every act of selfconstitution.”53 Most insiders have not consented to the social contract and outsiders
have no voice in determining the rules of exclusion. Democratic principles thus have
little to do with determining who is a member and has a voice. As one might expect,
the human rights regime reflects the paradox of closure. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognizes the right to leave a country but not the right to enter a
country that is not one’s own.54
Democracy’s false claim to the universality of its principles leads some to
question the morality of territorial boundaries. Joseph Carens, among others, argues
that the inequality of opportunity that flows from the mere fact of one’s place of birth
is arbitrary and unjustifiable.55 For Benhabib, however, the paradox at the heart of
democracy does not compel open borders, a position she rejects as utopian and as
denying the pluralistic value of bounded, self-governing communities.56 She instead
argues for more porous borders: “While we can never eliminate the paradox that
those who are excluded will not be among those who decide upon the rules of
exclusion and inclusion, we can render these distinctions fluid and negotiable
through processes of continuous and multiple democratic iterations.”57 In her view,
ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC
PARADOX (2000).
53. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 175; see also id. at 175 (The “territorial delimitation [of
democratic principles] involves war as well as conquest, negotiation as well as bargaining.”).
54. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 30 (noting “a series of internal contradictions
between universal human rights and territorial sovereignty are built into the logic of the most
comprehensive international law document in the world, [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights])”.
55. Joseph H Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. OF POL. 251 (1987)
(employing Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” to analyze the application of distributive justice principles across
borders); see also JOSEPH CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION (2013); PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES
OF EXCLUSION, LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND IMMIGRATION (2000); TERESA HAYTER, OPEN
BORDERS: THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION CONTROLS 149–72 (2000); SATVINDER SINGH JUSS,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2006); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS
(1989); JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2010); Arash
Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders,
36 POL. THEORY 37 (2008); Thomas Christiano, Immigration, Political Community, and
Cosmopolitanism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933, 954 (2008); Chandran Kukathas, The Case for Open
Immigration, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 207–220 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher
Heath Wellman eds., 2005). For an argument against applying distributive principles internationally, see
DAVID MILLER, AGAINST GLOBAL EGALITARIANISM 55 (2005).
56. Treating migrants more favorably does not require a commitment to open borders. See KOKCHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOTISM 80
(2004); Veit-Michael Bader, Fairly Open Borders, in CITIZENSHIP AND EXCLUSION 28 (Veit-Michael
Bader ed., 1997); Eric Cavallero, An Immigration-Pressure Model of Global Distributive Justice, 5 POL.,
PHIL. & ECON. 97 (2006).
57. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 177–78.
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“potentially all practices of democratic closure are open to challenge, resignification,
and deinstitutionalization.”58 The balance between the competing democratic
commitments of self-determination and universality can be refigured. Outsiders can
become insiders.
Because the treatment of unauthorized entrants directly raises the conflict
between universality and territoriality, Benhabib characterizes border issues as
“crucial test[s] for the moral conscience as well as political reflexivity of liberal
democracies.”59 Globalization has intensified borders as sites of contestation where
nations, primarily prosperous ones, assert their sovereignty and resist rights
assertions by others. By increasing the free flow of capital and goods, globalization
has reordered and sometimes decimated foreign economies, generating migratory
flows from poorer countries to richer ones. Commentators have detailed the ways in
which U.S. policy is implicated in the violence and economic pressures of Mexico
and Central American countries.60 More importantly for Benhabib, globalization has
also called into question the viability of the nation state as a way of structuring the
world.61 Linda Bosniak has similarly observed, “territory itself no longer organizes
social and political life in the determinative way it once did.”62 People have
developed layers of supranational and subnational attachments, including along
ethnic lines.63 Economic interdependence demands openness among states.64 As
Benhabib notes, there is “incongruity between the level of commercial, technological
58. Id. at 17.
59. SEYLA BENHABIB, CLAIMS OF CULTURE 177 (2002).
60. See, e.g., Deborah Weissman & Chantal Thomas, Labor Migration as an Unintended
Consequence of Globalization in Mexico, 1980-2000, in SOCIAL REGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
273 (Adelle Blackett et al. eds., 2011).
61. See Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV.
929, 932 (2006) (“Territoriality may be eroding as an organizing social force”); id. at 934 (“We can no
longer think of communities as culturally unified groups naturally tied to a territory”). For discussions
relating to globalization and cosmopolitanism, see GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN
ACCOUNT 45–83 (2009); DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION (2009); Anthony McGrew, A
Global Society?, in MODERNITY AND ITS FUTURES 61–116 (Stewart Hall et al. eds., 1992).
62. Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 389, 409 (2007); see also FRASER, supra note 34, at 12–29 (discussing the “demise of
Westphalian view” of sovereignty); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 166 (2004)
(discussing the “disaggregated world order, in which national government institutions rather than unitary
states are the primary actors”).
63. LINDA BASCH, NINA GLICK SCHILLER & CRISTINA SZANTON BLANC, NATIONS UNBOUND:
TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS, AND DETERRITORIALIZED NATION-STATES
(1994); Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind & Steven Vertovec, International Perspectives on Transnational
Migration: An Introduction, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 565 (2003). But see Nancy Foner, Engagements
Across National Borders, Then and Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2483, 2483 (2007) (“Contemporary
immigrants . . . are not the first newcomers to live what scholars call transnational lives.”); Alejandro
Portes, Conclusion: Theoretical Convergences and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant
Transnationalism, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 874 (2003) (arguing that transnationalism is a new
analytical perspective not a new phenomenon); Jonathan Weinberg, The End of Citizenship? 107 MICH.
L. REV. 931, 941 (2009) (arguing that “the phenomenon of immigrants maintaining active involvement
in, and ties to, their homelands—is not a new thing”).
64. James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J. Tichenor, Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The
United States as an Emerging Migration State, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 7 (2008). For a discussion
of how the movement of people is not like the movement of goods, see Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not
Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1109 (2010).
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and functional interdependence of the world community on the one hand and the
continuing role of sovereign statehood in defining the juridical status of individual
human beings on the other.”65 While borders have always marked insiders from
outsiders, this expressive function has become even more critical to countries like
the United States as the saliency of sovereignty wanes in economic and social
contexts. Some have theorized that the intensification of border controls, or
“hypersovereignty,” “compensate[s] for [the] loss” of sovereignty.66 Migration laws
may represent the last “bastion” of sovereignty, to which globalization poses a
challenge.67
B.

Discourse Theory

Benhabib shares intellectual roots with Jürgen Habermas. Both Habermas
and Benhabib advance theories of “discourse ethics,” the idea that “only those norms
and normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all
concerned under special argumentation situations named discourses.”68 Discourses
require certain prerequisites, namely “the equality of each conversation partner,” the
participants’ “symmetrical entitlement to speech acts,” and the “reciprocity of
communicative roles–each can question and answer, bring new items to the agenda,
and initiate reflection about the rules of discourse itself.”69 Discourses contrast with
other forms of communication where the conditions for deliberative dialogue are not
present, such as “bargaining, cajoling, brainwashing, or coercive manipulation.”70
65. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 175; see also, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS
133 (1999) (“National governments still have sovereignty over many matters, but they are
increasingly part of a web of rights and regulations that are embedded in other entities – from EC
institutions to courts defending the human rights of refugees.”); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 167–68 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that as “not only . . . an
economic process, but also . . . a political and cultural one,” globalization has challenged the nation-state,
which “appears to have lost its traditional centrality as the privileged unit of economic, social and political
initiative.”); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 409 (2007) (“[T]erritoriality is beginning to fray . . . largely because
territory itself no longer organizes social and political life in the determinative way it once did.”); Akhil
Gupta, The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in
Late Capitalism, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 179, 196
(1997) (“[M]igration, displacement, and deterritorialization are, increasingly, sundering the fixed
association between identity, culture, and place.”); James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J.
Tichenor, Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United States as an Emerging Migration State, 27 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 14 (2008) (noting a “liberal paradox” as “the economic logic of liberalism is one of
openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure.”). But see Miles Kahler, Territoriality and
Conflict in an Era of Globalization, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 1,
2 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (“No universal shift in the location of governance has
taken place. Rather, national governments, which have remained bounded territorial units, have adapted
in order to retain the effectiveness and accountability demanded by their constituents.”).
66. WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY 67 (2010).
67. CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL 2 (2008). For a discussion of the
Westphalian conception of the nation state, see CABRERA, supra note 34, at 72–73.
68. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 13 (citing JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 66, 93 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990))
(internal quotations omitted).
69. DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 71 (emphasis removed).
70. Id.
AND ALIENS
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While the difference in kind between discourse and strategic communication is
critical to discourse theory, these forms of communication often intermix in
practice.71 At bottom, however, Benhabib contends that authentic discourses can, and
do, occur in the classic venues of democratic government, including the courts and
legislature, as well as in the media and in society at large.72
Universal cosmopolitan norms increasingly translate into actual
democracies through a dynamic process Benhabib calls “democratic iteration.”73 A
term borrowed from Jacques Derrida, iteration signifies that meaning is not fixed,
that each utterance generates new meaning.74 As applied to the political sphere, the
term connotes a discursive process through which democracies interpret and
reinterpret universal norms, thereby giving them content.75 Iterations are the multiple
“processes whereby cosmopolitan norms and the will of democratic majorities can
be reconciled, though never perfectly, through public argumentation and
deliberation. . . . “76 Benhabib describes iterations as dialectical because they involve
the “interplay” between official political and legal institutions as well as the
“unofficial public sphere of citizens’ actions and social movements.”77 This process
is “jurisgenerative.”78 Official and civil society actors give specific content to
71. Telephone Interview with Seyla Benhabib, Professor of Political Sci. & Philosophy, Yale Univ.
(Aug. 9, 2016).
72. See RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 19–20 (contending that these discourses occur in real
life and are not solely aspirational). See generally DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 89 (discussing
the difference in kind between “a de facto consensus” and “a rationally motivated one”) (emphasis
removed). Benhabib describes iterations as “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and
exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked,
posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil
society.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). She states that these iterations “can take place in the ‘strong’ public
bodies of legislatives, the judiciary and the executive, as well as in the informal and ‘weak’ publics of
civil society associations and the media.” Id. at 112.
73. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 47-48.
74. Id. at 47 (citing Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC. (Samuel Weber &
Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1977)).
75. Id. at 159 (“When rights are appropriated by new political actors and filled with content drawing
on experiences that could not have guided those rights in their initial formulation, they open up new worlds
and create new meanings.”); see also DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 73 (“The discourse of
democracies . . . is necessarily caught in the tension generated by the context- and communitytranscending validity dimension of human rights, on the one hand, and the historically formed, culturally
generated, and socially shaped codifications and legislation of existing juridico-civil communities, on the
other.”).
76. Seyla Benhabib, Democracy, Demography, and Sovereignty, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 8, 13
(2008).
77. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 163.
78. DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 15 (internal quotations omitted). Benhabib adopts the
term “jurisgenerative” from Frank Michelman, who, in turn, took it from Robert Cover. It refers to the
law’s capacity to generate transformative, alternate meaning, even outside formal lawmaking procedures;
see also Benhabib, Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic
Sovereignty, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 696 (2009) (defining “jurisgenerativity” as the law’s “capacity
to create a normative universe of meaning that can often escape the ‘provenance of formal lawmaking,’”
(citing Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1983))). Benhabib
identifies her notion of iteration with Judith Resnik’s idea of the “migration” of international law norms
“across state boundaries and institutional jurisdictions.” BENHABIB, supra note 20, at 112 (internal
quotations omitted).
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universal norms, and they do so through both “formal lawmaking” and informal
processes that impart meaning to the law.79 People become not only the “subjects”
but the “authors” of the laws by which they are bound.80 Cosmopolitanism, for
Benhabib, thus does not consist of a static group of governing principles.81 Rather,
through the embrace of the flux of iteration, cosmopolitanism is “a negative ideal
aimed at blocking false totalization.”82 Benhabib discusses the French debate about
headscarves in schools and the German controversy about extending voting rights to
noncitizen residents as examples of “complex legal, political, and cultural
phenomena through which democratic iterations have occurred.”83
III. IMPRISONING FAMILIES
The United States has a long history of imprisoning immigrant families.
Even when the national border was at its most permeable, the deprivation of people’s
liberty figured prominently in U.S. immigration policy.84 Ellis Island, long a symbol
of America’s receptivity to the world’s “poor,” “tired,” and “huddled masses,” was
also a site of unsettling state violence against newcomers seeking entry.85
Immigrants, male and female, young and old, endured public probing of their naked
bodies.86 Those who were not immediately permitted to enter were detained,
sometimes for lengthy periods of time.87 Children, including young ones, were
sometimes separated from family members during detention.88 In a rare, candid
account of conditions at Ellis Island, an official in charge described “so much filth
and dirt on the floor that one would actually slip in the slime while walking, and yet
little children were playing on the floor.”89
After relatively open U.S. borders became a thing of the past, detention
centers served less as a place for entry screening and more as an ancillary to
deportation from the interior or exclusion at the border. Families were not routinely
detained. In the 1990s, some families were confined in questionable conditions in

79. See DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 15 (internal quotations omitted).
80. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 49.
81. See DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 74 (distinguishing her approach from those of
Martha Nussbaum and others, which “proceed from a philosophical view of human nature or agency to a
specific schedule of rights”).
82. DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 2 (internal quotations omitted) (citing David J. Depew,
Narrativism, Cosmopolitanism, and Historical Epistemology, 14 CLIO 357, 375 (1985)).
83. RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 181.
84. The United States’ detention of families has extended outside the immigration context. In the
early 19th Century, authorities detained Native American families in military forts during their removal
from their historic lands. During World War I and World War II, the United States detained families of
U.S. citizens and immigrants of Japanese descent in internment camps.
85. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
86. RONALD H. BAYOR, ENCOUNTERING ELLIS ISLAND: HOW EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS ENTERED
AMERICA 48–49 (2014). Families were also detained at Angel Island on the west coast. Id. at 69.
87. Id. at 39–40.
88. Id. at 49–50, 84.
89. Frederick A. Wallis, Treating Incoming Aliens as Human Beings, 14 CURRENT HIST. 434, 442
(1921).
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hotel rooms near the airport for days, weeks, or longer.90 Outside U.S. territorial
boundaries, U.S. authorities detained families that were part of mass exoduses. After
the 1991 coup d’état in Haiti that toppled Jean Bertrand Aristide, U.S. authorities
interdicted at sea and detained thousands of Haitian nationals, including families, at
the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba.91 Families who were part of the 1994
exodus from Cuba were also detained at Guantanamo.92 In early 2001, immigration
authorities converted a former nursing home in Berks County, Pennsylvania into
Berks County Family Residential Center, the first dedicated family detention
center.93 While families detained at Berks were kept together, immigration
authorities detained some children apart from their parents at other locations.94
After the post-September 11 expansion of immigration law enforcement,
U.S. officials increasingly invoked their authority to detain and separate children
from their parents. A 2005 report of the U.S. House of Representatives expressed
concern about the practice of separating children—”even as young as nursing
infants”—from their parents.95 The House Committee directed the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) “to release families or use alternatives to detention such
as the Intensive Supervised Appearance Program whenever possible.”96 The
Committee further stated that “[w]hen detention of family units is necessary, the
Committee directs DHS to use appropriate detention space to house them together.”97
Rather than expand alternatives to detention for families, however, DHS embarked
on its first experiment with large-scale family detention. In May 2006, the
Department contracted with Williamson County, Texas to open the T. Don Hutto
Residential Center, a former medium-security prison in Taylor, Texas run by the
Corrections Corporation of America.
With the capacity to hold over 500 women, men, and children, Hutto was
the first large-scale U.S. family detention center. Government officials described the
facility as “represent[ing] a clear departure from historical detention settings.”98

90. See WOMEN’S COMM’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, BEHIND LOCKED DOORS: ABUSE
REFUGEE
WOMEN
AT
KROME
DETENTION
CENTER
8
(2000),
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/joomlatools-files/docman-files/krome.pdf.
91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER PRESIDENT ARISTIDE’S RETURN (vol. 7,
no. 11, Oct. 1995), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Haiti3.htm.
92. Mireya Navarro, Last of Refugees from Cuba in ‘94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/01/world/last-of-refugees-from-cuba-in-94-flight-now-enterus.html; see also Silvia Pedraza, Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus, 5 J. INT’L INST. (1998),
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0005.204.
93. Family Immigration Detention: Why the Past Cannot be Prologue, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION
(Am.
Bar
Ass’n),
Jul.
31,
2015,
at
13,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20A
BA%20Family%20Detention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that with only 84
beds, the Berks facility has only limited capacity, although a planned expansion would double its
capacity).
94. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 109-79, at 12 (2005).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Press
Release,
Immigration
and
Customs
Enf’t
(Nov.
7,
2011),
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/facilities-hutto; see also Family Residential Standards, U.S. IMMIGR. &
OF
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Detained families enjoyed what the government described as “free and open
movement, recreational and educational participation, food services and medical and
mental health care.”99 Advocates painted a very different picture.100 They reported
that families were imprisoned in small cells with two twin bunks and an exposed
toilet, usually for 11-12 hours a day.101 Children were required to wear prison
uniforms and had limited access to fresh air.102 Guards disciplined the children by
threatening to separate them from their parents.103 Medical, mental health, and dental
care were inadequate, as was the children’s access to schooling.104
In 2007, advocates alleged that the government’s detention of children at
Hutto violated the terms of the 1997 settlement agreement in Flores v. Meese, a case
that had established ground rules for detaining children.105 The consent decree
requires that children be released when possible and that any detention be in the least
restrictive setting.106 The government settled the legal challenge and, in late 2009,
the Obama Administration announced new detention priorities and agreed to halt
detaining children at the prison.107 Large-scale detention of families was in hiatus
until the summer of 2014.

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/family-residential/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2016).
99. Press
Release,
Immigration
and
Customs
Enf’t
(Nov.
7,
2011),
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/facilities-hutto.
100. See generally Margaret Talbot, The Lost Children, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 3, 2008),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/03/03/the-lost-children (describing the conditions at the T.
Don Hutto Residential Center).
101. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16–17, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070 (W.D. Tex. 2007), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-TX0005-0001.pdf.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 3, 20.
105. Id. at 1–2, 4 (proposing three “humane and cost-effective” alternatives to Hutto: “the Intensive
Supervision Assistance Program, a program that utilizes electronic monitoring as a way to supervise
immigrants released into the community, and for which Congress specifically allocated funding,” the Casa
San Juan, “a 24-hour care facility run by Catholic Charities in San Diego, with which the U.S. Marshal
Service has a contract,” and Casa Marianella, a refugee home in Austin, Texas (emphasis in original));
see also Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (1991) (No. 88-6249),
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf.
106. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164SS, 2007 WL 1074070 (W.D. Tex. 2007), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-TX-00050001.pdf. The judge in the case said he found “it inexplicable that [the government has] spent untold
amounts of time, effort and taxpayer dollars to establish the Hutto family-detention program, knowing all
the while that Flores is still in effect.” Bunikyte v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070,
at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007).
107. Settlement Agreement, In re Hutto Family Detention Center, No. 1:07-CV-00164-SS (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2007), consolidated with Bunikyte v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070 (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 9, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/hutto_settlement.pdf; DORA
SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 6, 2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/
offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
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CONTAINING THE “SURGE” OF FAMILIES

In 2012, the number of people seeking unauthorized entry across the U.S.Mexico border was on the upswing.108 In the fall of 2013, the White House received
information that tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors and families from
Central America would seek to cross the border in the summer of 2014.109 As many
as 16,000 women with their children started arriving on a monthly basis.110 Many
communities reacted with an outpouring of support for the migrants.111 However,
some journalists portrayed the women and children as threats to our health and
security, calling them gang members and drug dealers and suggesting that they
carried diseases and could facilitate the entry of terrorists.112 Reacting in line with
this media message, one group of people in Southern California demonstrated against
federal buses carrying migrants, forcing the buses to turn around.113 The Ku Klux
Klan stated that the border crossers were a threat to the “white homeland” and antiimmigrant militia experienced a surge in membership.114

108. From January 2012 to March 2012, the number of apprehensions at the southwest U.S.- Mexico
border jumped from 25,714 apprehensions to 42,218. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., FY 2000-FY
2015,
BP
TOTAL
MONTHLY
APPS
BY
SECTOR
AND
AREA
(2015),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Secto
r%20and%20Area,%20FY2000-FY2015.pdf.
109. NAT’L CTR. FOR BORDER SEC. AND IMMIGRATION, UNIV. OF TEX. AT EL PASO, UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILDREN PROJECT (Mar. 20 2014), http://www.scribd.com/doc/233623001/National-Center-forBorder-Security-Final-Report-March-20-2014.
110. U.S. Border Arrests of Children, Families Surge 52% in August, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 21,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-border-arrests-of-children-families-surge-52-in-august1442884799.
111. For example, Governor Patrick of Massachusetts stated that he was “deeply moved by the
outpouring of support” of over 1,600 people for children who crossed the border fleeing violence and he
pledged his state’s willingness to help. Steve Annear, Massachusetts Will Not House Children Fleeing
Central
America,
BOS.
MAG.
(Aug.
5,
2014,
5:27
PM),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2014/08/05/immigrant-children-massachusetts-governorpatrick/; see also 2 Massachusetts Facilities Offered to Shelter Illegal Immigrant Kids, WCVB BOS. (July
18,
2014,
5:25
PM),
http://www.wcvb.com/news/patrick-no-final-decision-on-shelteringmigrants/27013260.
112. Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Lawmakers Say Migrant Children Are Diseased, Should Be Denied Shelter,
THINK PROGRESS, http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2014/07/11/3456878/are-central-american-childrefugees-bringing-in-diseases/ (last updated July 11, 2014).
113. Michael Martinez & Holly Yan, Showdown: California Town Turns Away Buses of Detained
Immigrants, CNN (July 3, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/02/us/california-immigranttransfers/.
114. Keegan Hanks, KKK Joins Immigration Debate With Calls for “Corpses” on the Border,
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2014/07/31/kkk-joins-immigrationdebate-calls-corpses-border (last updated July 30, 2014).
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“No Bond” Policy

On May 12, 2014, DHS Secretary Johnson announced that the Department
had reached its limit to deal with the situation,115 and the White House appointed the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate the response to the increased
migratory flow.116 U.S. authorities responded with unyielding detention practices,
quickly converting part of a training camp for federal officers in the remote town of
Artesia, New Mexico into a temporary facility to hold 700 women and children as
families.117 In June 2014, a senior government official told reporters visiting the
facility that “the goal is to process the immigrants and have them deported within 10
to 15 days to send a message back to their home countries that there are consequences
for illegal immigration.”118 Asylum officers engaged in rapid-paced screenings of
the women’s claims for asylum.119 Of the 952 women and children who passed
through the temporary Artesia detention center between the end of June 2014 and
the beginning of October 2014, 306 were deported.120 The deportations slowed
considerably after volunteer attorneys and law students mobilized to represent the

115. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Written Testimony of DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson for a House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing Titled “Dangerous Passage: The Growing
Problem
of
Unaccompanied
Children
Crossing
the
Border”
(June
24,
2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/06/24/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-jeh-johnson-house-committeehomeland-security.
116. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Johnson on Increased Influx
of
Unaccompanied
Immigrant
Children
at
the
Border
(June
2,
2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/06/02/statement-secretary-johnson-increased-influx-unaccompaniedimmigrant-children-border; Press Release, The White House, The Obama Administration’s GovernmentWide Response to Influx of Central American Migrants at the Southwest Border (Aug. 1, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01/obama-administration-s-government-wideresponse-influx-central-american-.
117. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Artesia Temporary Facility for Adults
with Children in Expedited Removal (June 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/06/20/fact-sheetartesia-temporary-facility-adults-children-expedited-removal#. Immigration authorities closed down the
temporary Artesia Residential Family Center on December 15, 2014. See Alicia A. Caldwell, U.S. to Close
Family
Detention
Center
in
New
Mexico,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Nov.
19,
2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/11/18/close-family-detention-center-newmexico/OATfFczRA0PzRGRn5i659O/story.html; Jeremy Redmon, ICE to Close Controversial
Immigration Detention Center in New Mexico, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.myajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/ice-to-close-controversial-familyimmigration-dete/nh9hj/.
118. Juan Carlos Llorca, Fed Says They Will Expedite Deportations to 10-15 Days at N.M. Facility,
SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/fed-says-they-will-expeditedeportations-to-10-15-days-at-nm-facility/.
119. Family Immigration Detention: Why the Past Cannot be Prologue, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION
(Am.
Bar
Ass’n),
Jul.
31,
2015,
at
20,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20A
BA%20Family%20Detention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting that “attorneys
reported that critical government screening interviews . . . were conducted by government officials at a
pace of no fewer than 20 interviews a day, seven days a week” and that attorneys characterized Artesia as
“ground zero for the evisceration of due process” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
120. Melinda Henneberger, When an Immigration Detention Center Comes to a Small Town, WASH.
POST (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/01/when-animmigration-detention-center-comes-to-a-small-town/.
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women in late July. With lawyers, the pace of removals fell 80 percent within one
month and within two months it had fallen 97 percent.121
In immigration court, lawyers for the United States argued for no bond or a
prohibitively high bond by citing national security concerns.122 The government
contended that permitting bond would encourage migration and human smuggling,
which diverts resources needed elsewhere “to deal with other threats to public safety,
including national security threats.”123 Government attorneys also directly linked the
migrants and national security, arguing that a no-release or high bond policy would
give the government time to “screen the detainees and have a better chance of
identifying any present threats to our public safety and national security.”124 At no
point, however, did the government allege that any of the women and children, as
individuals, constituted a threat to national security. After legal advocates challenged
the national security argument in U.S. district court, the government pledged not to
take general deterrence into account when making release decisions regarding the
surge families.125
In August 2014, immigration authorities started detaining women and
children at Karnes County Civil Detention Center in Karnes City, Texas, a private
detention center with 608 beds that was designed to hold adults.126 Four months later,
officials opened the nation’s largest immigration detention center, the South Texas
Family Residential Center, in the remote town of Dilley, Texas.127 The new massive
121. Stephen Manning, Ending Artesia, INNOVATION LAW LAB (Dec. 20, 2014)
https://innovationlawlab.org/the-artesia-report-story/.
122. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2015). In this case, the declarations of
high-ranking immigration officials confirmed that implementation of “no bond” or “high bond” policies
were intended to reduce the migration of Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans to the United States.
See Department of Homeland Security’s Submission of Documentary Evidence, (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.aila.org/infonet/dhs-blanket-policy-no-release. In support of this position, the government’s
lawyers cited to a Board of Immigration Appeals decision. See In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 581 (B.I.A.
2003) (upholding a general deterrence rationale in an individual bond hearing). The government asserted
that the families were motivated to come to the United States because they did not think that they would
be detained, or detained for very long. Declaration of Philip T. Miller, ¶¶ 9, 14,
http://nationofimmigrators.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/224/2014/12/ICE-Bond-copy.pdf.
123. Declaration of Philip T. Miller, supra note 122, ¶ 13.
124. Id. ¶ 14.
125. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, ICE Announces Enhanced Oversight for
Family Residential Centers (May 13, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-enhancedoversight-family-residential-center. See generally, R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 176 (D.D.C.
2015).
126. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, ICE Opens Its First-Ever Designed-andBuilt Civil Detention Center (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-opens-its-first-everdesigned-and-built-civil-detention-center (the detention center was “designed to house adult, male, lowrisk, minimum security detainees.”). Officials changed the name to the Karnes Residential Center once
families began to be detained at the facility. Karnes is slated to expand its capacity to 1,158. Press Release,
The GEO Group, The GEO Group Announces 626-Bed Expansion of the Karnes County Residential
Center in Texas (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141219005408/en/GEOGroup-Announces-626-Bed-Expansion-Karnes-County.
127. The express purpose of the Center was “to increase [the government’s] capacity to detain and
expedite the removal of adults with children who illegally crossed the Southwest border.” See Press
Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, ICE’s New Family Detention Center in Dilley, Texas to
Open in December (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-family-detentioncenter-dilley-texas-open-december.
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detention center is a private prison built and operated by the Corrections Corporation
of America, the largest for-profit prison company in the world.
Between July 2014 and the end of May 2015, the height of the “surge,”
immigration authorities detained 6,381 women and children.128 Approximately 58
percent were eventually released and 687 were removed.129 Of the 1,835 women and
children who remained detained at the end of May 2015, 74 percent had been
detained less than 30 days and 15 percent had been detained between 30 and 59
days.130
B.

Detention Conditions

U.S. immigration authorities defend their family detention centers as
“effective and humane,” stating that they “operate in an open environment, which
includes medical care, play rooms, social workers, educational services, and access
to legal counsel.”131 Opponents argue that the only humane solution is to end family
detention entirely.132 When Democrats from the U.S. House of Representatives
visited the border detention centers in June 2015, they characterized the facilities
“prison camps,” described one of the family detention centers as “more locked down
than juvenile jails,” and reported that the children were suffering “terrible
psychological damage” from being detained.133 One hundred thirty six members of
the House of Representatives and 35 Senators publicly oppose family immigration
detention.134 The American Academy of Pediatrics “express[ed] . . . concern[] for the
health and well-being of children and mothers who are being detained in family

128. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, ICE Statement (June 23, 2015),
http://www.ksat.com/news/ice-statement_2015073008401534.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, ICE’s New Family Detention Center in
Dilley, Texas to Open in December (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-familydetention-center-dilley-texas-open-december.
132. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FAMILY DETENTION STILL HAPPENING, STILL DAMAGING 4 (Oct.
2015),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-family-detention-still-happening.pdf
(recommending that the “Obama Administration . . . end family detention once and for all.”). On May 15,
2015, Senator Reid stated that “[e]nding family detention is the only answer,” after federal authorities
announced that they would improve oversight over family detention but would not end it. Press Release,
Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Senator Reid Statement on Administration’s Decision
to Review Family Detention Policies (May 15, 2015), http://www.aila.org/infonet/senator-reid-statementreview-family-detention.
133. Michael Oleaga, Immigration Reform News: House Democrats’ Concern of Immigrant ‘Prison
Camps’
in
Texas
Continues,
LATIN
POST
(Jun.
25,
2015,
2:05
PM)
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/61946/20150625/immigration-reform-news-house-democrats-deepconcern-immigrant-prison-camps.htm. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, after a visit
of some of its Commissioners to McAllen, Harlingen, and Karnes in 2014, expressed “concern[] over
allegations of sexual, physical, and verbal abuse by U.S. border officials committed while migrant and
refugee children and families are in [U.S.] custody as well as the inadequate detention conditions at border
and port of entry stations and family immigration detention centers.” Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note
7, at 10.
134. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 132, at 5.
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detention centers in Texas and Pennsylvania.”135 According to the American Bar
Association, family detention “violates applicable laws, standards, and human rights
norms.”136 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights have urged the United States to cease
detaining families.137
Advocates allege that the family detention centers suffer from the same
problems as prior ones.138 The Karnes facility operates like a prison, with heavy
security, limited visitation, body counts, and strict rules and schedules.139 Detainees
allege that they have been sexually assaulted and denied medical care for serious

135. Letter from Sandra G. Hassink, President, Am. Academy of Pediatrics, to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 24, 2015), https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/federaladvocacy/Documents/AAP%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Johnson%20Family%20Detention%20Fi
nal.pdf; see also Kronick et al., Asylum-Seeking Children’s Experiences of Detention in Canada: A
Qualitative Study, 85 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 287, 292 (2015) (“any incarceration, even under
relatively safe conditions, is damaging for immigrant children, especially those with high levels of
previous trauma exposure”); Allen S. Keller & Amanda K. Winchester, NYU Ctr. for Health and Human
Rights, Health Impact of Family Immigration Detention: A Case Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FAMILY
DETENTION
STILL
HAPPENING,
STILL
DAMAGING
18
(Oct.
2015),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-family-detention-still-happening.pdf.
136. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 6 (referring to the three remaining family detention centers
in Karnes City, Dilley, and Berks County). The American Bar Association has called for DHS not to
renew its contracts with the Karnes, Dilley, and Berks detention centers. Id. at 6. The American Bar
Association Civil Immigration Detention Standards state that children should not be detained except as a
last resort. Id. at 32.
137. See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 9 (stating that “[d]eprivation of liberty must be a last resort used
only after individualized determination, and the best interests of the child must guide all actions taken in
regard to children.”). The UNHCR guidelines say that children “should in principle not be detained at
all.” United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards
Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, at 34 (2012) [hereinafter
Guidelines]. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has “urge[d] the [United States] to end
its practice of automatic and arbitrary immigration detention of families.” Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra
note 7, at 11. With respect to adult asylum seekers, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees has interpreted the Convention on Refugees as requiring “that the detention of asylumseekers should be a measure of last resort with liberty being the default position.” Guidelines, supra, at
13. The United States’ policy of detaining asylum seekers has fallen under heavy international criticism.
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has stated that “detention shall be the last
resort and permissible only for the shortest period of time.” Rep. of U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, ¶ 67, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/21 (Feb. 16, 2009), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/110/43/PDF/G0911043.pdf?OpenElement.
138. See Ian Gordon, Inside Obama’s Family Deportation Mill, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 19, 2014, 7:15
AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/family-detention-artesia-dilley-immigrationcentral-america; Hylton, supra note 14; Tierney Sneed, New Immigrant Detention Centers Have Old
Problems,
U.S.
NEWS
(Oct.
30
2014,
5:35
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/30/immigrant-detention-centers-in-texas-new-mexicohave-old-problems-report-finds.
139. See RANJANA NATARAJAN ET AL., REPORT REGARDING GRAVE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IMPLICATED IN FAMILY IMMIGRATION DETENTION AT THE KARNES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER 11–12
(2014),
https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2014-10-ICIACHR_Karnes_Report.pdf; see also Ed Pilkington, ‘Soul-Destroying’: One Migrant Mother’s Story of
Life at Dilley Detention Center, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/may/22/immigrant-mothers-dilley-family-detention-center-texas.
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conditions.140 Some women attempted suicide.141 Women and children have filed
complaints under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging serious abuse while
detained.142
Critics report that many of the women and children have suffered severe
and long-term effects from being detained, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
major depressive disorder, and persistent depressive disorder.143 Women have
reported a range of different effects on their children, including weight loss, crying
at night, insomnia, nightmares, aggression, disobedience, separation anxiety, bedwetting, headaches, and diarrhea.144 The effects are particularly acute for those
women and children who have suffered trauma in their home country or in crossing
the border.145
An advocate’s report on conditions at the temporary detention center in
Artesia stated that 88 percent of the women and children detained at that facility
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and several children engaged in selfharm.146 One attorney described many of the children at Artesia as “gaunt” and

140. Detainees alleged that officials sexually abused them late at night and in the early morning and
that they kissed, fondled, and groped them in front of other detainees, including children. See Letter from
Marisa Bono, Staff Attorney, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of
Homeland
Sec.
(Sept.
30,
2014),
http://www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/2014-0930_Karnes_PREA_Letter_Complaint.pdf; Marisa Bono, Staff Attorney, Mexican Am. Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, PREA and Complaints of Sexual Abuse at ICE Karnes Facility, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.usccr.gov/OIG/Marisa_Bono_WrittenStatement_FINAL.pdf; Maurice Chammah, Long
Shorts and Baggy Shirt, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 17, 2015, 5:19 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/17/long-shorts-and-baggy-shirts. The Department of
Homeland Security investigated the allegations and found that they were unsubstantiated. See
Memorandum from John Roth, Inspector Gen., Office of the Inspector Gen., to Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mga/OIG_mga-010715.pdf.
141. See Franco Ordoñez & Sandra Cuffe, Teen Mom Who Attempted Suicide Speaks Out After
Deportation, MCCLATCHYDC (June 17, 2015, 2:50 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nationworld/national/article25186393.html.
142. See Roque Planas, Detainees in Family Detention File $10M In Medical Neglect Claims,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/detainees-in-familydetention-file-for-10m-in-damage-claims_55ca5b85e4b0f73b20baf282?kvcommref=mostpopular;
Migrants Were Allegedly Abused, Neglected, and Traumatized, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2015/08/11/3690253/10-million-tort-migrant-women-detention/;
Letter from R. Andrew Free, to Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://cbpabusestest2.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/10m-ftca-complaint-on-behalf-of-5-mothersandrew-free.pdf (administrative Federal Tort Claim Act claims); see also Allie Yee, Conditions at ForProfit Immigrant Detention Facilities in Texas Draw Legal Action, FACING SOUTH (Feb. 19, 2015),
https://www.facingsouth.org/2015/02/conditions-at-for-profit-immigrant-detention-facil.
143. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 132, at 8–9; see also UNIV. OF ARIZONA, UNSEEN
PRISONERS: A REPORT ON WOMEN IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES IN ARIZONA 23 (2009).
Human Rights First reports that doctors who met with families in immigration detention concluded that
“family detention cannot be implemented in a way that does not jeopardize the mental well-being of
children and their parents.” HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 132, at 8.
144. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 132, at 9.
145. See id. (noting that “[m]any of these asylum seekers are survivors of domestic violence and have
experienced a number of severe, life threatening traumas during their lives, including early childhood
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.”).
146. See Manning, supra note 121.
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“malnourished” and “really sick.”147 Mothers reportedly held children, “even the
older ones, . . . like babies.”148 Some were “screaming and crying” and some were
“lying there listlessly.”149 Another attorney said she saw a mother bottle-feeding her
seven-year-old.150 Detainees said they were made to sleep eight to a room and that
there was little opportunity for exercise or stimulation.151 Artesia had a classroom for
the children to attend school, but it only operated sporadically.152
Legal advocates have filed complaints on behalf of 32 families with DHS’s
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of Inspector General
alleging inadequate medical and mental health care at Dilley, one of the permanent
family detention centers.153 In June 30, 2015, advocacy groups filed a complaint with
the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
detailing the “psychological harm caused when mothers and children seeking asylum
in the U.S. are detained in jail-like facilities.”154 The complaint contained
documentation from mental health professionals who evaluated the women and
children.155

147. Hylton, supra note 14.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Letter from Lindsay M. Harris, Michelle N. Mendez, Karen S. Lucas, and Amy Fischer,
CARA Pro Bono Project, to Megan Mack, Off. of C.R. and C.L., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and John Roth,
Off. of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 6, 2015) (on file with Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n);
see also Letter from Karen Lucas, Katharina Obser, and Beth Werlin from American Immigr. Lawyers
Association, Women’s Refugee Commission, and American Immigration Council, to Megan Mack, Off.
of C.R. and C.L., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2015) (on file with American Immigration Lawyers
Association).
154. Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Traumatizing Impact of Family Detention on
Mental Health of Children and Mothers (Jun. 30, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/pressreleases/2015/impact-family-detention-mental-health.
155. Concerns about medical care at Dilley include the accidental overdosing of children with an adult
hepatitis A vaccine. Over a period of five days in early July 2015, detention officials gave approximately
250 children an adult dose of hepatitis A vaccine. See Press Release, Am. Immigration Council, Vaccine
Overdose to Detained Children Another Sign that Family Detention Must End (Jul. 4, 2015),
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom/release/vaccine-overdose-detained-childrenanother-sign-family-detention-must-end. Detention officials reportedly “dragged [children] from their
beds at 4:00 am to be given shots while their mothers . . . st[ood] helplessly by without being told what is
going on or being allowed a say in the matter.” Id. An advocate spoke with a mother of a child who had
received shots who reported that “her 4-year-old was feverish, not eating, having trouble walking and
complaining of the pain in his leg.” Amy Martyn, Texas Immigrant Prison Accidentally Gave a Bunch of
Kids an Adult Strength Vaccine, THE DALLAS OBSERVER (July 9, 2015, 1:33 PM),
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-immigrant-prison-accidentally-gave-a-bunch-of-kids-anadult-strength-vaccine-7381479.
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The June 24, 2015 Policy Change

About the same time that advocates filed the complaints with DHS’s Office
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of Inspector General, the United
States announced that it would back away from its hardline approach to family
detention. On June 24, 2015, Secretary Johnson stated that he would make
“substantial changes” to family detention and that the United States would stop
holding families who had passed their initial asylum interviews in “long-term
detention.”156
This announcement came four months after advocates had commenced
litigation seeking to enforce the Flores consent decree, the same agreement that
formed the basis of the 2007 challenge to the Hutto family detention center.157 The
action alleged that Dilley and Karnes were not accredited to detain children and that
children were not being released as required by Flores. On July 24, 2015, a month
after the Secretary declared the policy shift on family detention, the U.S. district
court issued a preliminary injunction finding that the Flores consent decree
unambiguously applies to all children and ordered the government to comply with
the settlement provisions “without unnecessary delay.”158
While the large-scale, long-term detention of families may be, for now, a
thing of the past, the United States continues to detain large numbers of families until
the completion of their initial asylum screenings, usually about twenty days.
Advocates allege that the government is dragging its feet on complying with the
district court order under Flores and that twenty days is still too long for the families
to be detained.159 Immigration authorities subject most released women to electronic
surveillance through ankle bracelets and put their cases on special rocket dockets in
immigration court. If the women are ordered removed, authorities prioritize their re156. Gamboa, supra note 2.
157. The motion to enforce Flores was filed on February 2, 2015. Flores v. Lynch, No. CV 85-04544
DMG, 2015 LEXIS 112911, at *24, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 15-56434,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12439 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016). The government defended its actions by arguing
that Flores only applies to unaccompanied children. See Hylton, supra note 14 (quoting a government
lawyer as saying that “[t]he Flores settlement comes into play with unaccompanied minors [only]”).
158. Order Re Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action and Defendants’ Motion to
Amend Settlement Agreement at 24–25, Flores v. Lynch, No. CV 85-04544 DMG, 2015 LEXIS 112911,
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 15-56434, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12439, (9th
Cir. July 6, 2016); Flores, 2015 LEXIS 112911, at *24. The order mandates that an accompanying parent
can only be detained if there is a significant flight risk or public safety threat that cannot be mitigated by
alternatives to detention like bond and supervision. In the case of an emergency or influx of children
where there is no licensed facilities and no suitable adult to whom to release a child, the court order permits
the government to extend the detention of the child beyond five days. But the government must seek to
release the child “as expeditiously as possible.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
this part of the judge’s order. Flores v. Lynch, No. 15-56434, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12439, at *7, *28,
(9th Cir. July 6, 2016). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights urged the Administration to comply with
the U.S. District Court’s order. See Letter from U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, to President Obama, (Sept.
11 2015), http://www.usccr.gov/press/2015/PR_Flores_Letter_9-11-15.pdf.
159. Advocates state that the government routinely holds children longer than five days in detention
and forty percent of families are still detained for longer than twenty days. Officials take the position that
children are eligible for release with their parent only after the parent passes a credible fear interview and
that that the asylum office backlog in credible and reasonable fear interviews has made it difficult to
release the families within five days, as the court in Flores has ordered.
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detention and deportation. Women who do not pass the initial asylum screening are
detained until they are deported, a process that can take many months or over a
year.160 In protest of their lengthy detention, some detained women have engaged in
hunger strikes.161 Moreover, despite disavowing general deterrence as a justification
for family detention, the government persisted in arguing in the Flores enforcement
action in court that family detention “dis-incentivizes future surges of families
crossing the Southwest order,” a claim that the district court judge characterized as
“speculative at best, and, at worst fear-mongering.”162
The United States continues to jail approximately 2,000 women and their
children on any given day. This high rate of family detention occurs in the midst of
what critics have dubbed an incarceration “binge” in the United States.163 The daily
average number of people in immigration detention has grown from 6,600 in 1996
to over 26,000 in 2015.164 In 2013, the United States detained a total of more than
440,000 people in over 250 facilities, including private prisons and county jails.165
Per capita, this rate of civil detention is the highest in the world.166 The federal
government spends about $1.84 billion a year on immigration detention,
approximately $159 a day per every detained noncitizen.167 Detaining families is
160. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, LONG-TERM DETENTION OF MOTHERS AND CHILDREN IN PENNSYLVANIA
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Long-Term-DetentionBrief.pdf.
161. See Renée Feltz, Mothers at US Immigration Center on Hunger Strike to Protest Year in Custody,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/15/immigrationwomen-hunger-strike-pennsylvania-berks-county.
162. Defendants’ Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Why the Remedies Set Forth in the
Court’s July 24, 2015 Order Should Not Be Implemented at 24, Flores v. Lynch, No. CV 85-04544 DMG,
2015 LEXIS 112911, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 15-56434, 2016 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12439, (9th Cir. July 6, 2016); Flores, 2015 LEXIS 112911, at *19.
163. See generally JAMES AUSTIN, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA’S IMPRISONMENT BINGE (2011); see
also Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in Immigration Detention and Alternatives, 1 J.
ON MIGRATION & HUMAN SEC. 97, 100-101 (2013) (“comparing other countries’ rates of immigration
detention to the United States”).
164. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Clinton’s Inaccurate Claim That Immigrant Detention Facilities Have a
POST
(May
15,
Legal
Requirement
to
Fill
Beds,
WASH.
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/05/15/clintons-inaccurate-claimthat-immigrant-detention-facilities-have-a-legal-requirement-to-fill-beds/ (stating that the “average daily
detainee population in fiscal 2015 was 26,374, according to DHS”); see INS Deportation, Detention,
MIGRATION NEWS (June 1998), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1547.
165. Migration & Refugee Serv., U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops & Ctr. for Migration Studies,
Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the Immigrant Detention System, 3 J. ON MIGRATION &
HUM. SEC. 159, 162,169 (2015); see generally, JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRANT
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2013,
ANNUAL
REPORT
1
(Sept.
2015),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
166. See United States Immigration Detention Profile, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT,
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states/introduction.html (last updated
Sept. 2016) The United States maintains the largest immigration detention infrastructure in the world. An
official Immigration and Customs Enforcement database, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act,
showed a U.S. detainee population of 32,000 on the evening of January 25, 2009. Id.
167. DR. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,
IMMIGRATION
DETENTION
OVERVIEW
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
10
(2009),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf; JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, ANNUAL REPORT (Dec. 2013),
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more costly at approximately $266 per person a day.168 Much of the funding for
detention goes to private prison companies.169
The United States’ penchant for immigration detention cannot be explained
by high levels of unauthorized border crossings. Even during the height of the 20142015 flow of Central American families into the United States, unauthorized
crossings in the aggregate were at an annual rate of 480,000, a historic low since the
1970s.170 Moreover, the number of border crossers in the family and unaccompanied
minor migration since 2014 pales in comparison to unauthorized migratory flows
into other countries. For example, the civil war in Syria has forced over four and a
half million people to seek refuge in neighboring countries.171 In Turkey alone, the
number of displaced Syrians is approximately 2.5 million.172 In Lebanon, Syrians
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_1.pdf; The Math of
Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies,
NAT’L
IMMIGRATION
FORUM
(Aug.
22,
2013),
http://immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf (“This funding level
would amount to $5 million per day spent on immigration detention or $159 per day per person.”). The
United States, “spends more on immigration enforcement agencies than on all its other principal criminal
federal law enforcement agencies combined.” DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN
THE
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY
9
(2013),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidablemachinery.
168. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Chairman Mikulski Releases Summary of
Emergency
Supplemental
Funding
Bill
(Jul.
23,
2014),
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/minority/chairwoman-mikulski-releases-summary-ofemergency-supplemental-funding-bill; see also, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ALTERNATIVE TO
IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LESS COSTLY AND MORE HUMANE THAN FEDERAL LOCK-UP,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/aclu_atd_fact_sheet_final_v.2.pdf. Human Rights First
estimates that family detention will cost the government over $400 million a year if it proceeds with its
plan to expand family detention beds to 3,700. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 132, at 5. The New
York Times reported that a government funded study “of more than 500 detainees between 1997 and
2000, found that 93 percent will appear in court when placed in a monitoring program” and that “[t]he
savings of such a program for the 2,400 detainees at Dilley would be about $250 million per year.” Wil
S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html.
169. See The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK (May 2011), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (reporting that in 2009
forty-nine percent of immigration detainees were held in private detention centers); see also Cristina
Parker et al., For Profit Family Detention: Meet the Private Prison Corporations Making Millions by
Locking
Up
Refugee
Families,
GRASSROOTS
LEADERSHIP
(Oct.
2014),
http://grassrootsleadership.org/reports/profit-family-detention-meet-private-prison-corporations-makingmillions-locking-refugee#1.
170. Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Johnson Regarding Today’s Trip
to Texas, (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/12/15/statement-secretary-johnson-regardingtoday%E2%80%99s-trip-texas (also stating that unauthorized crossings peaked in 2000 at 1.6 million).
171. Syrian Regional Refugee Response, REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN (Sept. 26, 2016),
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Sept. 26, 2016).
172. Syrian Regional Refugee Response Turkey, REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (last updated Sept. 26, 2016). The United States
has offered to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees for fiscal year 2016 and has given $4.5 billion in aid to help
with the Syrian refugee crisis. Gardiner Harris, David E. Sanger & David M. Herszanhorn, Obama
Increases Number of Syrian Refugees for Resettlement to 10,000, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-administration-to-accept-10000syrian-refugees.html; Carol Morello, U.S. Gives $419 Million More to Aide Syrian Refugees, WASH. POST
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fleeing the civil war compose approximately 20 percent of the country’s
population.173 In contrast, the approximate 300,000 Central American families and
unaccompanied minors who have entered the United States since January 2014
constitute a mere .08 percent of the total U.S. population.174
V.

TERRITORIALITY, UNIVERSALITY, IDENTITY

The United States’ shifting decisions regarding detention of Central
American families reflect the fundamental democratic tension identified by
Benhabib between the commitment to universal principles, such as human dignity
and freedom of movement, and the necessity of maintaining sovereignty through a
territorial boundary. Government officials initially propounded a strong message that
the United States would enforce its borders by detaining the families until their
claims were processed, asserting “we will send you back.”175 In contrast, the decision
to cease the long-term detention of families that had made an initial showing of
asylum refigured the balance between respecting the universal principle of human
dignity and enforcing the border, tipping the nation toward the former. The
significant scaling back of long-term detention of immigrant families aligns with the
cosmopolitan view that people should not be criminalized for moving across borders
between countries.
At the height of the border crossings in 2014, the United States brought to
bear the full force of its massive law enforcement apparatus, spending $340,746 per
day on the detention of women and children.176 In Benhabib’s terms, the families—
as “poor migrant[s]”—”bec[ame] the symbol of the continuing assertion of
sovereignty.”177 The extraordinary lengths taken by the United States to enforce its
territoriality are apparent from its decision to engage in the large-scale detention of
a vulnerable and non-threatening population. Because children, particularly young
ones, are viewed as innocents, the action of detaining them represents a radical
assertion of sovereign control, with consequences beyond the harm to those detained.
The national security rationale advanced by lawyers representing the United
States to justify the detention of women and their children further illustrates the
brazen nature of the government’s position. The fact that the government for many
months maintained a national security rationale to justify “no” or “high” bond
detention of families demonstrates the extreme lengths to which the United States
(Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-gives-419-million-moreto-aid-syrian-refugees/2015/09/21/7f0157c6-607e-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html.
(Feb.
3,
2016),
173. Syria’s
Refugee
Crisis
in
Numbers,
AMNESTY INT’L
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/.
174. See United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien
Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 (last updated
Sept. 9, 2016).
175. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement Before the Senate
Committee on Appropriation (July 10, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statementsecretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-senate-committee-appropriations.
176. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, COSTLY FAMILY DETENTION DENIES JUSTICE TO MOTHERS
AND
CHILDREN
(Aug
2014),
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Family%20Detention%20Factsheet.pdf.
177. DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 102.
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was willing to go to assert its sovereignty and further entrenched the country’s
carceral approach to resolving social and political challenges.
Detention, even under decent conditions, banishes people to living what
Giorgio Agamben has called “bare life” and dehumanizes the jailed and the jailer
alike.178 But the danger of detention is not simply that it imperils the dignity of both
the victim and the perpetrator. Rather, the fear is that, over time, the violence
becomes normalized, transforming into commonsense.179 It seems logical, even
inevitable, that thousands of children and their mothers should be jailed for having
tried to enter the country unlawfully.180
But the tough talk and mass detention of poor Central American families
did more than privilege sovereignty over human dignity. The actions also proclaimed
U.S. national identity as middleclass and white rather than economically diverse and
multicultural.181 As Benhabib has noted, “[m]igrations are the site of intense conflicts
over . . . identities.”182 While U.S. officials conveyed concern about people,
especially children, making the dangerous journey to cross the border, the subtext to
their message was that the arriving families were unwelcome lawbreakers.
Detention, especially when conducted on a large scale, communicates that the group
characteristics of the people detained are deviant or undesirable. The hyperincarceration of poor black men in the criminal justice system marks young black
men as a group as potential deviants. The detention of poor Latinos similarly
stigmatizes all Latinos as having questionable immigration status. As the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights has recognized, “immigration detention
. . . works to criminalize migration, which has multiple, negative effects on the
protection of migrants’ rights and society’s perception of migrants, and may
encourage xenophobia.”183 The detention of children conveys a particularly potent
message: the deviancy must be particularly severe to justify the government’s
overriding of its normal, protective stance towards children.

178. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 174 (Daniel HellerRoazen trans., 1998) (referring to the detention of immigrants as establishing a “camp” marked by the
existence of “bare life”).
179. See generally Jacques Rancière, The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge,
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Autumn 2009, at 3, 11.
180. The harms of our carceral nation are considerable. For discussion of the collateral consequences
of criminal hyperincarceration, see generally Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of
Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost
of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). For discussion
of the collateral consequences of both criminal and civil hyperincarceration, see Rebecca Sharpless,
“Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53
HOUS. L. REV. 101, 119–32 (2016).
181. States “exert[] absolute control over its borders, in the name of identity, or community, or simple
power.” DAUVERGNE supra note 67, at 37.
182. DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 102.
183. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and
Unaccompanied
Children,
at
9,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II.155
(July
24,
2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf.
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The relabeling of the women and children as illegal entrants not only
required abstraction and dehumanization. It relied on, and perpetuated, a racial and
class message. When the United States detains thousands of poor Central American
women and children, it projects a national image of middleclass whiteness. The
image of poor and dark-skinned detainees stands in implicit contrast with a national
image of whiteness. One need look no further than the conservative news media
coverage for the express articulation of this subterranean imagery. As discussed
above, some of the media coverage portrayed the women and children as gang
members, drug dealers, and threats to national security and public health.184 The
protest against migrants being bused into a California town also sent the message
that the border crossers were unwelcome strangers.185 The racial coding of the
“surge” was also apparent in the reinvigoration of extreme anti-immigrant groups
that had been active during the debate surrounding immigration reform ten years
earlier. The surge prompted people to join militias and the Ku Klux Klan issued a
statement that the border crossers threatened the “white homeland.”186 The United
States’ position on family detention thus aligned with, and reinforced, the expressly
racial statements and imagery of the far political right.
A.

Insiders Versus Outsiders

The United States’ strong message of exclusion was also significant for
what it took as a silent premise: that the current members of the polity, acting through
the executive branch, could legitimately exclude this latest group of outsiders. While
this assumption is by no means extraordinary, it became clear that government’s
definition of insiders who constitute the polity included not only U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents but also undocumented immigrants who had entered the
country before January 1, 2014.
The decision to engage in the large-scale and lengthy detention of families
classified as outsiders was driven in part by the White House’s desire to be viewed
as tough on immigration enforcement in order to shore up popular support for the
legalization of people already inside the United States. At the time of the surge, the
Administration had implemented Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, an
administrative program to give temporary permission to remain in the United States,
and a work permit, to people who had arrived before they were sixteen.187
Immigration officials also had begun to exercise prosecutorial discretion to refrain

184. Esther Yu-His Lee, Lawmakers Say Migrant Children Are Diseased, Should Be Denied Shelter,
THINK PROGRESS (July 11, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2014/07/11/3456878/are-centralamerican-child-refugees-bringing-in-diseases/.
185. Michael Martinez & Holly Yan, Showdown: California Town Turns Away Buses of Detained
Immigrants, CNN (July 3 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/02/us/california-immigrant-transfers/.
186. Keegan Hanks, KKK Joins Immigration Debate with Calls for ‘Corpses’ on the Border,
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (July, 30 2014), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2014/07/31/kkkjoins-immigration-debate-calls-corpses-border.
187. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Aug. 03, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-daca.
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from deporting people considered low priorities for removal.188 Republicans blamed
the White House for being lax on law enforcement and for broadcasting a message
that undocumented youth would be treated leniently.189 In June 2014, in the midst of
the border surge, the Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing entitled “An Administration-Made Disaster.”190 A driving force behind the
decision to detain families en masse was thus to rebut the charge that the United
States was slack on immigration enforcement and signal that unauthorized
newcomers would be subject to the full force of U.S. deportation law.191
To engender support for its programs to permit groups of already present
undocumented people to stay (and its push for eventual legislative reform), the White
House reacted to the surge of border crossers by drawing a bright line between
outsiders and insiders, namely the newcomers and those already here. The decision
to detain and engage in expedited deportations of women and children amounted to
the political theater of marking these recent entrants as outsiders. The
insider/outsider distinction could not have been clearer when Secretary Johnson
announced:
Our new policies therefore draw a sharp distinction between past
and future. Those who came here illegally in the past, have been
here for years, have committed no serious crimes, and have
become integrated members of American life, are not priorities for
removal. But, all those who came here illegally after Jan. 1, 2014,
in other words, beginning of this year, are now priorities for
188. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants to the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services,
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
189. House Speaker John Boehner declared the surge a “humanitarian disaster” encouraged by the
Obama administration’s actions. Letter from Speaker John Boehner, U.S. Congress, House of
Representative,
to
President
Obama
(Jun.
20,
2014),
http://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/06-20-14-Letter-to-POTUS-on-Border-Crisis.pdf.
House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte issued a statement blaming President Barack Obama’s “lax
immigration enforcement policies” for the crisis. Statement from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Hearing on Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-the-department-of-homeland-security; Statement
from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Oversight of the Department
of Homeland Security (Apr. 28, 2015), Arizona Governor Jan Brewer sent a letter to congressional leaders
blaming the crisis on Obama’s “refusal to enforce our nation’s immigration laws” and urging them to
“take action, get answers and stop the lawlessness that is unfolding.” Brewer to Obama: Stop
‘Unconscionable’ Policy of Dumping Illegal Immigrants in Ariz. Cities, FOX NEWS (June, 3, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/03/brewer-to-obama-stop-unconscionable-policy-dumpingillegal-immigrants-across/.
190. An Administration Made Disaster: Hearing on the South Texas Border Surge of Unaccompanied
Alien Minors, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. Sess. 2, (2014),
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/hearing-an-administration-made-disaster/.
191. The White House blamed rumors in Central America that new childhood arrivals would qualify
for the administrative program of 2012 granting deferred action and sent the Vice President to Central
America to correct the message. Sahil Kapur, White House: New Child Migrants Won’t Get Legal Status,
TPM (June 16, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/white-house-child-migrants-wont-get-legalstatus.
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removal to their home countries. This must be clear going forward:
Our borders are not open to illegal migration.192
The Secretary thus called for treating newcomers harshly in the hopes that
the nation would accept those already here as members of the polity.193 Although
pre-January 1, 2014 undocumented immigrants are not citizens, or even lawful
permanent residents, they enjoy some form of insider status as eligible to stay in the
United States as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.194 In Benhabib’s terms, Johnson
was laying the groundwork to extend the demos. But he was doing it by excluding
the families who had arrived after the January 2014 date.
The “insider” cut-off date illustrates Benhabib’s insights regarding the
paradox of democratic closure and the contingency of insider and outsider status.
While the arbitrariness of the January 1, 2014 date is readily apparent, what is less
obvious is that the membership distinction drawn by this date is similar to historic
events that have conferred membership in the past. The history of the United States
is the story of an immigrant founder whose taking of power later becomes shrouded
in the legitimacy of the law.195 The United States thus lacks a principled way of
distinguishing among today’s surge families, pre-January 1, 2014 unlawful entrants,
and non-Native American U.S. born citizens. From this point of view, Secretary
Johnson’s message “we will send you back” is an expression of coercive power to
detain and deport, exercised by people whose status as insiders is as historically
contingent as the “outsider” status of the women and children.
The paradox of democratic closure thus contains a prescription. It
destabilizes strong claims to exclusion, teaching us to aspire to looking upon
outsiders with “infinite receptivity,” to react with skepticism to strong
insider/outsider claims, and to understand all such claims as contestable and
contingent.196 In the context of family detention, the paradox suggests that we should
act as if today’s detained women and children may be tomorrow’s members of the
demos and, eventually, the ethnos.197
B.

Discourse Theory In Action?

Having argued that the dialing back of family detention represented a
rebalancing of the competing concerns of universality and territoriality, I here
consider whether rationale dialogue was the driving force behind the policy shift. As
explained above, Benhabib posits that discourse in the form of “argument,
contestation, revision, and rejection” within U.S. legal and political institutions and
in civil society is the engine that should (and often does) drive democratic change.198
192. Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Johnson Regarding Today’s Trip
to Texas (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/12/15/statement-secretary-johnson-regardingtoday%E2%80%99s-trip-texas (also stating that unauthorized crossings peaked in 2000 at 1.6 million).
193. See id.
194. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 188.
195. See generally BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER (2003).
196. ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 157.
197. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014) (discussing the view that
undocumented immigrants are “Americans in waiting”).
198. BENHABIB, RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 181.
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As discussed below, the shift in family detention may have been partially the result
of this type of discourse. But strategic bargaining and dynamics of power and
resistance were decisive.199
i.

Democratic Dialogue

Democratic dialogue played a role in the retreat from long-term family
detention. Senate and House Democrats began an important public discourse
regarding family detention. From the earliest moments of the surge, Democratic
leaders were vocal about treating the border crossers with dignity. On July 9, 2014,
the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a
hearing on the situation at the border.200 Senator Dianne Feinstein compared the U.S.
government’s treatment of the unaccompanied minors and families to the American
refusal to accept Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany aboard the MS St. Louis.201 In
May 15, 2015, Senator Reid issued the unequivocal statement that “[e]nding family
detention is the only answer,” after immigration officials said they would improve
oversight over family detention but would not end it.202 His words reflected a concern
with human dignity: “[d]etaining mothers and their children who are fleeing extreme
poverty, persecution, abuse and violence is unacceptable and goes against our most
fundamental values.”203 In the summer of 2015, a group of House Democrats
embarked on highly publicized trips to the detention centers and held a
Congressional hearing on family detention that was widely covered in the press.204
Discussion of the harms of family detention in the media may also have
influenced U.S. government officials. For example, in February 2015, the New York
Times Magazine featured a lengthy expose on family detention. The article, entitled
The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, was highly critical of the
Administration’s decision to detain the Central American families.205 The article
highlighted information from advocates about conditions at the detention centers,
detailed the sympathetic nature of the detainee’s legal claims, and questioned the
decision to build the nation’s largest detention center to hold women and children.

199. See infra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
200. Challenges at the Border: Examining the Causes, Consequences, and Responses to the Rise in
Apprehensions at the Southern Border: Hearing Before Dep’t of Justice Comm. On Homeland Sec. and
Gov. Affairs, 113th Cong. (Jul. 9, 2014), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/challenges-at-the-borderexamining-the-causes-consequences-and-responses-to-the-rise-in-apprehensions-at-the-southern-border;
see id. (statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (“We are
talking about large numbers of children, without their parents, who have arrived at our border—hungry,
thirsty, exhausted, scared and vulnerable.”).
201. Report: Feinstein Compares Immigrant Children to Jews Fleeing Nazi Germany, CBS NEWS
WASH. (Jul. 10 2014), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/07/10/report-feinstein-compares-immigrantchildren-to-jews-fleeing-nazi-germany/.
202. Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Senator Reid Statement on Administration’s
Decision to Review Family Detention Policies (May 15, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/whatshappening-in-congress/congressional-updates/senator-reid-statement-review-family-detention.
203. Id.
204. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
205. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html.
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While these political and media discussions may have played some role in
convincing the Administration to back down from its hardline detention position,
perhaps the most significant force was the combined effect of the lawsuits in U.S.
district court brought by advocates. The lawsuits challenged the use of deterrence
rationale as a basis for detention and alleged violations of the 1997 Flores consent
decree that governs the detention and release of children.206 For Benhabib, the
judicial branch can be a site of deliberative discourse, as opposed to strategic
bargaining.207 As a result of the first lawsuit, the government agreed to cease making
generalized national security arguments to block release of the families.208 The
second lawsuit led to a court hearing in April 2015 that likely prompted the Secretary
to announce the policy shift retreating from long-term detention in June 2015. In a
lengthy decision, the court ordered the children released “without unnecessary
delay” a month after the announcement.209
ii.

Strategy and Resistance

While democratic dialogue in the executive branch, courts, legislature, and
civil society had some role in the shift away from long-term family detention policy,
strategic bargaining and resistance strategies were more influential. A standard
critique of discourse theories is that they are overly optimistic about rationality and
consensus building and fail to account for the role of power and non-rational
action.210 Many have argued that the pre-conditions for true deliberative dialogue
rarely exist.211 Power dynamics, including a multitude of crosscutting acts of
authority and resistance, pervade democratic processes. As Michel Foucault has
observed, “human relations,” including communication, always involves a power
relationship.212 This critique portrays political theories that focus on rationality as
naive and as giving an incomplete descriptive and normative account of human
communication and relations. Where discourse theory sees reason and mutual
understanding, its critics see only assertions of power and resistance struggles.
Moreover, reasonable minds can disagree about whether certain activities constitute
rational deliberation or strategic bargaining. For example, the dialogue among

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Manning, supra note 121; supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 125.
Flores v. Lynch, No. 15-56434, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12439 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016).
See, e.g., Bent Flyvbjerg, Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society, 49 BRIT. J.
SOCIOLOGY 211, 215 (1998) (explaining that Habermas’ project “is rooted in an insufficient conception
of power.”); see also id. (summarizing differences between Foucault and Habermas).
211. See, e.g., Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
509, 554 (2010) (“Many discourse ethicists, such as Jurgen Habermas, however, insufficiently theorize
the effect of power on discourse.”); Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,
29 POL. THEORY 670, 672 (2001) (criticizing deliberative democracy theorists as “bracket[ing]” “power
differentials”). But see A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward A Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) (arguing that the internet community’s creation of standards
for online communication qualifies as a Habermasian discourse).
212. Raul Fornet-Betancourt et al., The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An
Interview with Michel Foucault, in THE FINAL FOUCAULT 1, 11, 18 (J.D. Gauthier trans., James Bernauer
& David Rasmussen eds., 1988).
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legislative leaders and in the media, described above, could be recast as strategic
rather than rational.
Some would also claim that litigation consists mainly of strategic
bargaining. But even if the two high profile victories in U.S. district courts, discussed
above, were illustrations of rational dialogue, these cases were only two of the many
courtroom battles to influence the shift in family detention policy. Equally important
was the mobilization by lawyers and law students to represent the individual women
and children in the detention centers.
Lawyers descended in the hundreds into the remote detention centers,
offering representation in immigration court to each and every detained woman and
child. These lawyers succeeded in crippling the executive branch’s well-oiled
deportation machinery. Employing what could be described as Gary Bellow’s “case
aggregation” approach, the lawyers asserted en masse their clients’ rights to release
and asylum, making it impossible for the government to proceed with its original
plan to deport the families quickly.213
Before the lawyers were present at Artesia, the temporary border family
detention center, only thirty-eight percent of the detained women were passing their
credible fear interviews, the first step to applying for asylum.214 The rate rose to
ninety percent after the advocates got involved. In the twenty-one weeks that
volunteer lawyers were present in Artesia, they completed 3,200 client appointments
and more than 600 hearings. Lawyers litigated fifteen cases to the final merits stage,
winning all but one.215 A coalition of nonprofit organizations now runs a full-time
project at Dilley to represent the families.216 Similarly, advocates provide
representation to detainees at Karnes.217
Advocates also filed additional lawsuits and administrative complaints that
may have added to the pressure on the government to retreat from long-term family
detention, even though they were unsuccessful or unresolved.218 These tactics, while
unlikely to succeed as individual actions, were part of an overall plan to keep the
plight of the Central American families in the public eye and to seek leverage with
the government. While it is possible to characterize these legal maneuvers as
deliberative, it may be more accurate to call them strategic.

213. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections On Political Lawyering, 31 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297 (1996).
214. See Manning, supra note 121.
215. Id. More cases were not litigated to the final hearing in the detention centers because the women
who pass initial threshold asylum interviews are released, usually after 20 days.
216. At Dilley, the pro bono representation is coordinated by CARA Family Detention Pro Bono
Project, a collaboration among the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, the American Immigration
Council, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, and the American
Immigration Lawyers Association. The University of Texas Immigration Clinic and pro bono attorneys
provide legal services to women and children detained at Karnes. See generally CARA FAM. DETENTION
PRO BONO PROJECT, http://caraprobono.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (for more information about the
CARA coalition).
217. Family Immigration Detention: Why the Past Cannot be Prologue, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION
(Am.
Bar
Ass’n),
Jul.
31,
2015,
at
21,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20A
BA%20Family%20Detention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf.
218. See supra notes 140, 154-155 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, some of the political dynamics in play were manifestly strategic
rather than discursive. When the surge started to garner media attention in the
summer of 2014, democrats were gearing up for the fall 2014 interim elections.
President Obama, concerned about how the border issue would play in electoral
politics, felt pressure to come out swinging with a heavy-handed enforcement
agenda. As mentioned above, he also sought to preserve whatever popular support
existed to create a pathway to permanent residency for those already inside the
country by drawing a clear line in the sand between insiders and new entrants. After
the fall elections, President Obama had less reason to pander to Americans’ panic
about the border. By the time of Secretary Johnson’s June 2015 announcement about
scaling back family detention, the number of border crossers had dipped and it
appeared that the surge was over.219 Without the pressure of an ongoing crisis, more
moderate approaches were possible and the political space opened for President
Obama to retreat from his earlier stance on family detention.
The policy shift was also the result of behind-the-scene dialogue among
executive branch staff and between these insiders and advocates. A significant
number of White House staffers and officials in the Department of Homeland
Security are individuals with considerable field experience, including former public
interest attorneys. These officials, who are often in dialogue with immigration
advocates, exerted influence over decision-makers to convince them that long-term
family detention should not be one of the Administration’s legacies.
Because of the limited role of discourse in causing the policy shift, the
retreat from long-term family detention could be described as tactical and bereft of
what Benhabib would call “normative learning.”220 The immigrants and their
supporters achieved gains outside of a wholly discursive process, making the change
fall short of a true iteration and rendering ephemeral any claimed progress toward
Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism. However, skeptics of discourse theory might see a
different lesson in the family detention example. The struggle against family
detention could demonstrate the failure of discourse theory to fully account for the
workings of power and resistance. In this view, the message for cosmopolitan agents
of social change is that they must not rely on discourse alone to ensure that the
balancing of territoriality against universality increasingly favors human dignity and
the freedom of movement.
VI. TOWARD MORE POROUS BORDERS?
The story of the 2014-2015 Central American border crossings illustrates
both the limitations and radical possibilities of using the rule of law to bring about
Benhabib’s vision of a world in which border crossings are decriminalized and
territorial boundaries are porous. Secretary Johnson chose his words carefully when

219. See Christian von Preysing, A Look at the Immigration Surge One Year Later, KGNS.TV (June
14, 2015), http://www.kgns.tv/home/headlines/A-Look-at-the-Immigration-Surge-One-Year-Later307319761.html; Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2015, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompaniedchildren/fy-2015 (last updated Nov. 24, 2015).
220. ANOTHER COSMPOLITANISM, supra note 32, at 50 (“In some cases, no normative learning may
take place at all, but only a strategic bargaining among the parties.”).
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he tempered his message that the surge families would be deported with the
assurance that the United States would “adhere to domestic and international law,
due process, and the basic principles of charity, decency, and fairness.”221 Although
the Secretary characterized his message as “simple,” his statements belied an
underlying tension. If the detained families were entitled to raise legal claims like
asylum, what made the Secretary so sure that the families would be deported? The
Secretary’s message was an attempt to boldly assert the U.S. government’s sovereign
right to exclude while recognizing that U.S. law allows people to apply for protection
from persecution. The reference to “charity, decency, and fairness” evokes Kantian
hospitality, discussed above as the prohibition on returning refugees to a place where
they are likely to be persecuted. The universal principle of nonrefoulement thus
placed a limit on the United States’ sovereign attempt to send everyone back.
While the June 2015 policy shift away from long-term family detention may
have recast the balance between universality and territoriality, it remained firmly
within the ambit of the rules of refugee protection. But the principle of nonrefoulement is just one of many possible ways of resolving the conflict between
maintaining a territorial boundary and subscribing to universal principles. If
territoriality sometimes gives way to universality, this balance could be struck
differently to recognize a fuller range of outsider rights and protections, either
through ruptures in domestic law or an expansion of human rights protections. As
explained below, a cosmopolitan world order with porous borders between states
appears to depend upon expansions of the demos to include unauthorized entrants
who are not refugees.
A.

The Limits of Refugee Law

Non-refoulement, the basis of U.S. asylum and protection law, enjoys wide
acceptance among nations, forbidding a country from returning people to a country
where they would likely suffer persecution.222 It, however, does not confer the right
to permanently remain. Moreover, its protection is confined to people who are likely
to be tortured or who meet the refugee definition, which mandates that the feared
persecution be on account of political opinion, race, nationality, religion, or
particular social group.223 Non-refoulement thus places only a narrow restriction on
sovereignty and rests on the assumption that democracy is consistent with territorial
limitations on the freedom of movement.

221. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement Before the Senate
Committee on Appropriation (July 10, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statementsecretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-senate-committee-appropriations (“We will send you back.”).
222. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (adopting the principle of nonrefoulement).
223. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 222, at 33 (“No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”); Convention Against Torture, supra note 222, at 3 (“No State
Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
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Without detracting from the hard fought victories of the women and
children detained at the U.S.-Mexico border, it is critical to understand that all gains
occurred within the framework of the refugee definition and in the context of family
detention. Arguments for the asylum seekers tended to exceptionalize them, counterposing them against economic or social migrants. Claims were not made where there
were no existing rights. Popular support for asylum seekers who are women and
children does not necessarily indicate greater acceptance of non-refugee,
unauthorized border crossers. The fact that the dialing back of family detention was
directed only at bona fide asylum seekers renders elusive any trajectory toward the
general decriminalization of movement across fluid territorial boundaries.
Government officials and advocates alike have operated on the assumption
that nothing other than the standards for asylum govern the families’ claims to be
released and remain. U.S. officials have made clear that people who fail to make a
threshold showing of a fear of persecution have no claim for release or protection
and will be deported. Attempts to persuade the Administration to protect a broader
class of persons under the Temporary Protection Status statute—used to grant
temporary status to immigrants from civil unrest or natural disasters in their home
countries—have failed.224
Many, though not all, advocates worked at all times within the asylum
paradigm. They consistently characterized the women and children as refugees,
expressly premising their claims on this exceptional status.225 Some objected to the
families being described as migrants rather than refugees.226 Reports written about
the surge families have also emphasized, or been limited to, refugees.227
Advocacy for the women and children also focused on their unique
vulnerabilities. The mobilization of democrats in the legislature, high-end media like
the New York Times, and volunteer lawyers sprang in part from people’s visceral
reaction to the detention of families, including very young children and women who
had been subject to appalling abuse in their home countries.228 The move to
exceptionalize the families and play for sympathy was effective and the only viable

224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (repealed 1996) (statute authorizing temporary protected status); Alfonso
Chardy, Obama Urged to Grant Temporary Protected Status to Central American Immigrants, MIAMI
HERALD (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article56439945.html.
225. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF FAMILIES SEEKING ASYLUM: A ONE YEAR
UPDATE (Jun. 2015), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-one-yr-family-detentionreport.pdf; Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Release of Refugee Families is LongOverdue Step (Jul. 13, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/release-of-refugeefamilies-positive-overdue-step.
226. See Your Questions Answered About Europe’s Migrant Crisis, NPR (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/24/434282807/facebook-q-a-europes-migrant-crisis
(providing a similar discussion relating to terminology used to describe refugees and migrants in Europe).
227. A notable exception is the 2015 report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
which recognized the “mixed” nature of the group and was equally concerned with the treatment of all of
the surge families. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note 7, at 9.
228. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. LAW REV. 1, 4–5 (1991) (discussing the portrayal of women and children as victims
needing our protection—in implicit contrast to men—as relying on outmoded gender politics).
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option. At the same time, it meant that successes were confined to this highly
particularized context, what Catherine Dauvergne has called a “confined niche.”229
Circumscribing the women and children’s rights claims to only what
domestic asylum law already provides makes perfect strategic sense in light of the
lack of meaningful alternatives. At the same time, any general theory of a
cosmopolitan or transnational view of the world must engage with the situation of
people who are not refugees. So-called economic immigrants “may face as much
danger as those who have been singled out for persecution.”230 Moreover, although
advocates might wish it to be otherwise, not all of the detained women and children
are refugees, even under the term’s broadest definition.231 Poverty and a desire to
reunite with family in the United States are powerful and understandable drivers of
migration. An important test for any claim that membership or borders has been reconceptualized is the treatment of non-refugee outsiders. Refugee law, while
capacious in many ways, is too thin of a reed to support Benhabib’s normative vision
of a cosmopolitan world with porous borders between countries.
B.

The Possibility of Rupture

While broader frames exist, they typically focus on unauthorized entrants
already within a country’s borders. Many in the DREAMer movement, which was
originally focused on undocumented youth, have expanded their mission to include
a wide range of undocumented immigrants.232 Similarly, the “#Not1More”
movement categorically opposes all deportations. As is typical of claims by
outsiders, these movements are framed beyond the bounds of existing domestic law.
Perhaps recognizing that Kantian hospitality is insufficient to promote porous
borders, Benhabib encourages ruptures in the law, such as amnesties for
undocumented people. Incrementally inclusive definitions of the ethnos and the
demos are part of Benhabib’s trajectory toward cosmopolitanism.
Amnesties reflect the paradox of closure that lies at the heart of democracy.
Like the initial drawing of a nation’s borders, amnesties redefine membership. Both
establishing territorial borders and granting membership status involve the claiming
of rights where none previously existed—a practice with a long history in liberal
democracies. As Bonnie Honig argues, the “practice of taking rights and privileges
rather than waiting for them to be granted by a sovereign power

229. DAUVERGNE, supra note 67, at 35; see also Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM
Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101 (2013) (pointing to the dangers of promoting
exceptionally sympathetic cases in the context of the DREAMer movement).
230. Susan Bibler Coutin, The Rights of Noncitizens in the United States, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
289, 294 (2011) (citing Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic Refugees: Unprotected in the United States by
Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L. L. POL’Y 269 (1999)); see also Howard Adelman, From
Refugees to Forced Migration: The UNHCR and Human Security, 35 INT’L. MIGRATION 7 (2001)
(questioning the distinction between being forced to move and having a choice)).
231. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note 7, at 9 (describing the group as a “diverse group of persons”
in “mixed migratory movements” which include “migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, women,
children, families, and other vulnerable persons and groups.”).
232. See Peter Nyers, No One is Illegal Between City and Nation, 4 STUDS. IN SOC. JUST. 127, 134
(2010). See generally Chantal Thomas, What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean
for Sovereignty?, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 392 (2013).
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is . . . quintessentially democratic . . . .”233 Rousseau posited a foreigner as a founder
of democracy.234 America was born when colonists seized sovereign authority.235
Honig thus urges us to “reassess[] . . . the much-reviled figure of the bad immigrant
taker[,]” reframing immigrant takers as agents of the “(re)founding” of America.236
In Benhabib’s terms, immigration amnesties reproduce the constitutive paradox of
closure, broadening the demos and redefining its limits. Of course, even amnesty
laws “endlessly reproduce categories of illegal at its boundaries,” making it difficult
to “us[e] law to alleviate illegality.”237
Amnesties or exceptions to the law thus appear to be a major driver toward
cosmopolitanism. Now that many surge families have been released into the interior
of the United States, they can pursue rights that do not formally exist. They can seek
inclusion in the “#Not1More” movement to halt all deportations and help bring about
future ruptures in the law that regularize the status of the undocumented. Viewed in
this way, the decision to end long-term, largescale family detention has done more
than advance the principle of human dignity. The release of families from detention
has added people to the category of potential future members of the polity. This
reality is not lost on U.S. immigration authorities, who have vigorously sought to
maintain the outsider status of the families by affixing electronic monitors on the
women, expediting their claims in court, and prioritizing their deportation if they
have a final order of removal.238
C.

The Promise of Human Rights

Somewhere between narrow Kantian hospitality and the radical rupture of
amnesty lie human rights restrictions on sovereign authority to deport based on such
rights as family unity, due process, and health. Unlike U.S. law, human rights law
recognizes limits on sovereignty beyond the principle of non-refoulement. Human
rights tribunals and bodies have increasingly interpreted human rights standards as
233. HONIG, supra note 195, at 99.
234. JEFFREY H. EPSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITS OTHERS 123 (2016). Honig notes that, “Immigrants
re-enact the original consent to the social contract, reinscribing the myth of the immigrant founding (a
myth that obscures the violence and conquest of the nation’s origins).” HONIG, supra note 195, at 99.
235. Id. at 99–100 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
1900)).
236. Id. at 73, 101.
237. DAUVERGNE, supra note 67, at 27, 37; see also RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 19, at 65–66
(discussing the “lingering paradox that every act of republican constitution establishes new ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders’”).
238. John Burnett, As Asylum Seekers Swap Prison Beds For Ankle Bracelets, Same Firm Profits,
National Public Radio (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/13/455790454/as-asylum-seekersswap-prison-beds-for-ankle-bracelets-same-firm-profits (discussing electronic monitoring); Philip E.
Wolgin, Ensuring Due Process Protections for Central American Refugees, Center for American Progress
(Feb.
1,
2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016/02/01/130294/ensuring-due-processprotections-for-central-american-refugees/ (discussing expedited dockets for the Central American
families and prioritization of their deportation); Safia Samee Ali, Obama’s ‘Rocket Docket’ Immigration
Hearings
Violate
Due
Process,
Experts
Say,
NBC
News
(Oct.
27,
2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/obama-s-rocket-docket-immigration-hearings-violate-dueprocess-experts-n672636 (discussing due process concerns relating to the “rocket dockets” for the
families).
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restricting the sovereign power to deport, at least from a country’s interior.239 The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recognized that “all immigration
policies, laws, and practices must be respectful of and guarantee the human rights of
all persons, including migrants and other non-nationals and persons in an irregular
migratory situation.”240 A small but growing body of decisional law in international
forums has interpreted human rights to family life, due process and
nondiscrimination, personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest, and health
as constraining nations’ sovereign authority to expel people who are living inside a
country, with or without status. As Jaya Ramji-Nogales has noted, “[t]he right to
family unity offers the most promise in protecting undocumented migrants against
deportation.”241
In 2010, the Inter-American Commission held in Wayne Smith, Hugo
Armendariz, et al. that the 1996 amendments to U.S. immigration law repealing
discretionary relief for lawful permanent residents convicted of an aggravated felony
violated the human rights to family life and due process.242 The Commission found
that the petitioners “had no opportunity to present a humanitarian defense to
deportation or to have their rights to family duly considered before deportation. Nor
were the best interests of their . . . U.S. citizen children taken into account by any
decision maker.”243 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee and the European
Court of Human Rights have ruled that countries cannot deport individuals, including
undocumented ones, in violation of the right to family.244 One of the guiding

239. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN
STATES 212 (1978) (noting that international law constrains how states treat foreign nationals); DAVID
WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 45–77 (2008) (noting several examples where
international laws restrict the ability of states to deport immigrants).
240. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note 7, at 29.
241. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘The Right to Have Rights’: Undocumented Migrants and State Protection,
63 KAN. L REV. 1045, 1055 (2015).
242. Smith v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10 ¶¶ 60, 64–65
(2010). In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, §§
440–42, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), restricted and then repealed the discretion
of immigration judges to halt removal under former section 8 U.S.C. §1182(c).
243. Smith, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶ 59. According to the Commission, “a
balancing test” was required to “reach a fair decision between the competing individual human rights and
the needs asserted by the State.” Id. at ¶ 58; see also Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on the Situation of
Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, ¶ 166 (2000),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Canada2000en/canada.htm (stating “separation of a family . . . may
only be justified where necessary to meet a pressing need to protect public order, and where the means
are proportional to that end.”).
244. See Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 41, 43–44 (2002) (holding that
Denmark would violate the right to family life if it deported a man with a serious drug offense because
his family would face “serious difficulties”); Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
¶ 47 (2001) (ruling that an immigrant convicted of a violent crime could not be deported because the
sovereign right to deport for a criminal record must be put in “fair balance” with right to family life);
Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No. 1011/2001, Human Rights Committee under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [Hum. Rts. Comm. under ICCPR],
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001, ¶ 9.8 (2004) (finding a violation of the right to family life if
immigrant was deported because of hardship to his family who had lived in Australia for many years); see
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international principles is the principle of the best interests of the child, a standard
that appears in U.S. law but not in key areas of U.S. immigration law.245
Less clear is whether human rights norms limit the sovereign right to
exclude at the border. Despite the growing acceptance of social and economic rights,
these rights have yet to be construed to constrain the sovereign decision to deny
entry.246 However, as standards evolve, one could imagine the recognition of the
right to move freely across borders, at least when entry is needed to secure economic
and social human rights. While such an evolution may be unlikely in the near future,
no conceptual barrier prevents it.
As currently constructed, human rights law, like U.S. domestic law, evinces
the classic tension of liberal democracy between universality and territoriality.
Although human rights norms claim to take people as the fundamental unit of
concern, they, in reality, balance the rights of individuals against sovereignty,
including the power to exclude from the border and expel from the interior. The right
to freedom of movement thus currently exists only within the boundaries of
sovereign states. As Hannah Arendt noted decades ago, the essential problem, as
illustrated by stateless people, is that human rights only have meaning as defined by
sovereigns.247 Catherine Dauvergne has similarly observed, “Rights talk in the
absence of other forms of privilege is often just that: talk.”248
Applying Hannah Arendt’s insight to undocumented people, Jaya RayaNogales has discussed human rights law’s false claim to universality, mapping the
ways in which current human rights instruments expressly and implicitly omit
undocumented individuals. She argues: “[e]ven defined narrowly, the right to
territorial security is not supported in any international human rights treaty or any
soft law produced by human rights treaty bodies” and “treaties and interpretive
bodies have consistently stated that they do not extend the right to territorial security
to undocumented migrants.”249 In particular, the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
expressly declines to recognize the right of migrants to “regulariz[e]” their status.250
also Human Rts. Comm., Views: Communication No 930/2000, annex, UN Doc CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000
(Aug. 16, 2001) (“Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”) (suspending deportation of failed
asylum seekers who were parents of a 13 year old son who had been born in Australia).
245. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note 7, at 32 (stating that “in interpreting and applying the
American Declaration, its provisions should be considered in the context of the broader international and
Inter-American human rights systems to include the incorporation of the principle of the best interests of
the child”). See generally David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979 (2002).
246. But see James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77
AM. J. INT’L L., 804 (1983).
247. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 292–96 (1951).
248. DAUVERGNE, supra note 67, at 22.
249. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 241, at 1051.
250. Id. Catherine Dauvergne has made the same point regarding the migrant worker’s convention and
the human rights of undocumented persons generally. DAUVERGNE, supra note 67, at 22; see also id. at
35 (“[T]he difficulties of meaningfully extending [human rights] standards to those without migration
status reveals a vital problem with being ‘merely human.’”). The United Nations International Law
Commission has drafted articles aimed at protecting undocumented migrants. While the Draft Articles on
the Expulsion of Aliens apply to both lawfully present and unlawfully present immigrants and recognizes
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A key question is whether human rights norms are inherently incapable of
protecting undocumented people from exclusion and expulsion. It is possible to
imagine the vanishing point of sovereignty, as discussed above. But the
disappearance of sovereignty raises the issue of whether authority for law can derive
from anything other than nation states.251 Answers to this question might lie only in
a reconceived, de-nationalized system of human rights or global law.252 But as long
as the world is ordered into separate sovereigns, it is unclear how far human rights
law could evolve to restrain sovereign authority to control the border, especially with
respect to the exclusion of new arrivals.
While it is possible to theorize the disappearance of national control over
borders, it is less clear whether this is a good idea. As commentators have noted,
some amount of regulation of the border may be needed for sovereigns to safeguard
the human rights of individuals already present, including the right to selfdetermination.253 At some tipping point, opening borders imperils the human rights
of existing residents. More generally, it remains to be seen whether a world of weak
nations would be better at promoting human rights. Austen Parrish, for example,
argues that “territorial sovereignty . . . achieves an underappreciated balance
between state and individual rights that often serves as a foundational prerequisite
for human rights to flourish.”254 It is an open question whether a stable and effective
anchor for the rule of law besides sovereign nations could exist.255 There may be
considerable downsides to decentering sovereignty, including for the protection of
human rights.
Law, including human rights law, is thus an enforcer of the border, the
creator of illegal people and bounded nations. At the same time, the law is malleable
and dynamic, and it provides emancipatory possibilities through amnesties and
expanding conceptions of human rights. The possibilities are radical, permitting
reimagination of the U.S. reaction to the arrival of the Central American families. In
a more cosmopolitan world, the women and children would not have been detained
or required to meet the refugee definition. They would have been accepted as having
limits on a state’s sovereign right to deport, the articles recognize robust sovereign authority to exclude
and expel. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 at 44 (2014).
251. DAUVERGNE, supra note 67, at 37 (stating the question is “whether law can draw its authority
from any source other than the nation”).
252. LUIS CABRERA, POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR THE
WORLD STATE 71–72 (1st. ed., 2004).
253. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereingty, Security and Soul,
50 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (2005) (discussing “the relationship of human rights to the state’s sovereign
obligation to defend its citizens”); James F. Hollifield et al., Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United
States as an Emerging Migration State, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 14 (2008) (“If too many foreigners
reside on the national territory . . . the citizenry or the demos may be transformed in such a way as to
violate the social contract, undermine the legitimacy of the government, and challenge the sovereignty of
the state itself.”); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 47 (1993) (arguing that
liberal principles cannot not apply internationally because there is little institutional enforcement).
254. Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099,
1105 (2011); see also DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY, supra note 20, at 90 (“the state is the principal public actor
that still has the responsibility to see to it that human rights norms are both legislated and actualized”).
255. NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL
LAW 4 (2010) (arguing that national and international law have become blurred such that “the national
sphere retains importance, but it is no longer the paradigmatic anchor of the whole order”).
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asserted their human dignity by fleeing violence and poverty, or as simply seeking a
better life by exercising their right to move freely. We would regard the families not
as refugees or even as women and children but as people engaging in a fundamental
act of humanity by moving across the globe, spurred by a multiplicity of motivations.
In the words of Pope Francis: “[T]housands of persons are led to travel north in
search of a better life for themselves and for their loved ones, in search of greater
opportunities. Is this not what we want for our own children?”256
D.

Making Cosmopolitan Change

Cosmopolitan change is not inevitable. The hard work of realizing
cosmopolitan democracy falls to politicians, advocates, and immigrants themselves,
employing the full range of communicative tools in “speech situations” that are often
less than ideal.257 The specter of failure looms large. Benhabib’s optimism that
history is bending toward her vision of the world is tempered by her
acknowledgement that the rebalancing of territoriality and universality sometimes
involves regression, even descent into xenophobia.258 The hostile reaction to the
plight of the Central American families, the continued growth of immigration
detention capacity, and the rise of Donald Trump to the Presidency may well signal
that the United States is moving away from Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism.
Whatever the current direction of the trajectory, Benhabib’s political theory
holds important teachings for those seeking to make our society more open to
immigrants. The tension between our competing commitments to universality and
territoriality means that any claim to more favorable rules of entry must recognize
the legitimacy of at least minimal territoriality claims. Those seeking to move us
along a continuum toward cosmopolitanism must acknowledge, and operate within,
the two poles of universality and territoriality.
Benhabib’s treatment of the paradox of democracy gives theoretical
grounding to those pushing for more porous borders and periodic amnesties. As
discussed above, democracies may need to exclude to exist, but this exclusion entails
that democracy’s claimed universality is not truly universal and that outsiders have
no say in the rules of exclusion.259 This lack of legitimacy at the heart of democracy
requires that insider/outsider distinctions be fluid and contestable. Immigrants asking
for inclusion act as authentic democratic subjects when they claim rights not yet
recognized under current law.
It may be that ideal-type discourse theory only considers legitimate those
norms and practices that emerge from rationale dialogue under ideal speech
situations. As theorized by Benhabib, however, discourse theory recognizes the
legitimacy of democratic norms that emerge in the real world. She acknowledges
that agents of change in social movements are strategic actors. As illustrated by the

256. Teresa Welsh, Pope Francis Stresses Immigration, Climate Change in Address to Congress, U.S.
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http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/24/pope-francis-stresses-immigration-climate-change-inaddress-to-congress.
257. JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
258. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
259. See supra 51-67 and accompanying text.
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legal and political gains of the family detention resistance movement, movement
actors legitimately employ both discursive and non-discursive methods, including
mobilization, strategic litigation, and messaging, to secure the political will needed
to create a more cosmopolitan society.260
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States’ detention of children and their mothers raises the issue
of human dignity in stark terms. But rather than read family detention as exceptional,
we should regard it as making plain the dehumanization that inheres in all detention
and border control. Some minimal amount of state violence may be inevitable, as
democracies may need to exclude at least some to survive. But if exclusion is
necessarily part of democracy, the question becomes how far a nation is willing to
go to enforce exclusion. Universality and territoriality collide not simply as
abstractions but as principles that guide competing policy choices about when, how,
and to what degree, a nation should deprive human beings of their basic dignity. How
democratic states resolve the tension between universality and territoriality shapes
their national identity.
By abandoning mass long-term detention of Central American families who
have made an initial asylum showing, the United States redrew the line between
enforcing sovereignty and respecting human rights and between insiders and
outsiders. To be sure, the extent of the shift should not be overstated, as U.S. officials
continue to detain families. Women who fail to pass initial screenings are detained
with their children for many months to over a year pending appellate review and
many released women are subject to intrusive electronic surveillance. Moreover, the
policy change was largely the result of strategic bargaining through the mobilization
of lawyers and acts of resistance, rather than democratic dialogue. At bottom,
however, the 2015 cessation of large-scale long-term, family detention of asylum
seekers who make a threshold showing was a significant rebalancing of universality
over territoriality.
The United States’ message to poor Central American families invoked law
to both exclude and protect. Although the government’s initial hope and expectation
was that the rule of law would largely be used to send the families back, it is clear
that this prediction was incorrect, given the high percentage of women with
compelling asylum claims. But the more radical suggestion lurking in the
cosmopolitan vision is that even more emancipatory potential for refiguring the
conflict between sovereignty and universality exists beyond domestic asylum law
and within the realm of human rights and ruptures in domestic law, like amnesties.
Once we accept that recent unauthorized border crossers have staked out a
legitimate claim to dignity, distinctions of all types, including the legitimacy of
current insiders’ claim to membership, become suspect. The paradox of democratic
closure calls into question hard and fast lines between insiders and outsiders. Today’s
detained mother and child could be, and by Benhabib’s lights should be, tomorrow’s
neighbor and voting member of the polity.
260. See generally Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1879 (2007) (providing a discussion of this mode of advocacy).
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As applied to the phenomenon of the border surge, Benhabib’s
cosmopolitanism suggests more ambitious courses of action than what the detained
families and their advocates could pragmatically claim. But central to Benhabib’s
theory of democratic change is the recognition that the march toward a more open
and multicultural society is imperfect and incremental. Only time will tell whether
the Obama Administration’s retreat from long-term family detention represents a
step in the direction of an increasingly cosmopolitan democracy with more porous
borders, or just a transient concession to effective mobilization and strategic
bargaining by the detained immigrants and their allies. Either way, Benhabib’s
analysis of borders and her cosmopolitan vision add depth to our understanding of
how immigration and immigrants are essential to democracy and provide an
enduring guidepost for immigrants and advocates. But, for now, Benhabib’s
normative vision of a world order with porous national borders that recasts
membership in increasingly universal terms exists only at the edge of imagination.

